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“Challenges to democracy in today’s Europe”

SYNTHESIS OF PLENARY SESSIONS AND WORKSHOPS

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I. Preface: The Schools of Political Studies and The First Summer University for Democracy

«For the past 13 years, the schools have been training future leaders who dare to think, dare to know, dare to speak, and dare to act in the interest of democracy, human rights and the rule of law»

Terry Davis¹

The first School of Political Studies was founded in Moscow in 1992, to train the new generation of political, economic, social and cultural leaders. It is not an academic study course as such, but a series of seminars and annual conferences on such themes as European integration, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and globalisation. The annual programme includes national activities and a closing session at the Council of Europe's headquarters in Strasbourg. At present 11 schools are operating in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Kosovo/UNMIK, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Croatia. New schools are in the process of constitution in Albania, Azerbaijan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Each school is run by a director appointed by a board, responsible for selecting 40 candidates each year and preparing the study programmes, and for the financial and administrative management of the school. The schools of political studies of the Council of Europe are national NGOs in their respective countries. The schools of political studies operate in regional networks and organise regional activities, particularly in the Balkans and the Caucasus. The schools' directors meet several times in the year to co-ordinate their activities and exchange experiences and good practices. Alumni associations have been set up in the participating countries and help to maintain and develop professional and social ties.

At the Organisation's Third Summit, in Warsaw on 16 and 17 May 2005, the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe's 46 member states acknowledged the role of the schools in strengthening democracy in Europe by including the programme in the Organisation's priorities for the years to come. The schools' study programme is piloted by the Directorate General of Political Affairs, which encourages synergies between the schools and the Council of Europe's activities in the countries involved in the programme. In addition to a basic financial contribution from the Council of Europe, the schools of political studies are financed by contributions from member and/or observer States, the European Union and international foundations and NGOs.

Since their foundation, each of the schools of political studies has attended closing seminars in Strasbourg, which focus mainly on learning about the European institutions. In 2005, about 400 participants attended 8 seminars at the Council of Europe. The seminar programmes are prepared by the Directorate General of Political Affairs, in close collaboration with local partners such as the City of Strasbourg, the Conseil général du Bas-Rhin and the Conseil Régional d'Alsace as well as the European Public Administration Centre (PEAP), including the ENA, the Robert Schuman University, the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, the Centre des Etudes Européennes de Strasbourg, and the Euro Institut.

In 2006, in order to increase the visibility of the programme and forge stronger ties between participants from the different schools, the closing seminars for all the schools were merged into a single grand event, the Summer University for Democracy, from 10 to 14 July. This event, supported by the partners in the PEAP, who was helping with the preparations, has drawn around

¹ Secretary General of the Council of Europe

500 participants from 15 countries at the Palais de l'Europe. The programme included plenary sessions, workshops and study visits. Public figures representing the French, European and international authorities and experts from the Council of Europe and the PEAP took the floor at the Summer University for Democracy and helped lead the proceedings.

The main item on the agenda of the Summer University for Democracy was a joint discussion on how to address "Challenges to democracy in today's Europe". The emphasis was made on themes that are common to all European democracies, which, despite a diversity of practices and a wide variety of political and geopolitical contexts, are all confronted with similar problems, for example participation, integration, security and public integrity. The aim was to identify the specific features of the European approach to these issues so as to foster a feeling of belonging to the European entity and to consider the joint responses devised by the various European organisations, the models and practices proposed, and the different types of joint action.

The programme included contributions from the fields of political science and law. The experts included a mixture of political actors, representatives of international organisations and academia. Three main themes had been chosen to guide the discussions on the various aspects of the functioning of pluralist, democratic and free European societies: democracy in operation, European strategy(ies), and aspects of public governance. Three major conferences were held on these subjects for the students from the various schools. The discussions continued in the workshops, which were run by each school focusing on an interactive approach and topical issues.

II. Introduction: Democracy and Democratisation

“Today we do not live in the age of democracy but in the age of continuing democratisation”

Elena Nemirovskaya²

Democracy – what does it mean in today’s changing world? The opening session of the Summer University for Democracy, launched with the sounds of the European Anthem at the Council of Europe, dealt above all with the multiple and complex notions of democracy. In his opening speech, Terry Davis³ has made a powerful statement: *“Democracy is much more than an electoral code. It is a code of behaviour, an attitude and a state of mind. Of course democracy requires laws to function, but legislation is there to provide support, not substance”*. Democracy must be based on participation, leadership and accountability, which on their part require knowledge, skills and information. Serguei Stanishev⁴ has demonstrated how the definitions, the substance and the instruments of democracy have changed throughout centuries and especially during the recent couple of decades. There are multiple definitions of democracy. Most often, democracy is considered as the government of the people, by the people and for the people. Also, democracy is seen as a conflict of ideas and interests, or simply as the rule of the majority.

Yet, as Serguei Stanishev has pointed out, nowadays many of these definitions do not appear sufficiently comprehensive to capture the complex nature of democracy. The recent experience of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has shown that democracy is not simply about the rule of the majority, freedom of speech and multi-party system. The rule of the majority cannot be seen as a sufficient requirement for democracy, without a strong devotion to the protection of minorities – whether ethnic, religious or cultural. There seemed to exist a consensus between all the participants of the opening session about the importance of *inclusion* – social and political – in true democratic societies. Terry Davis has fretted the serious under-representation of women in national parliaments and governments, while Serguei Stanishev has shown that until equal participation becomes natural in the political culture of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, quotas for women and young people may be necessary.

Accountability of institutions represents another essential element of democracy. A party elected by the majority should not forget about its responsibility to respond to the questions of the opposition, civil society and media. Furthermore, political parties should be democratic within themselves, and there should exist transparency as to their funding. Serguei Stanishev emphasised the need of the dialogue between political parties and the civil society. *Ad hoc* coalitions with trade unions and NGOs on national and regional levels may help to bring about new ideas and carry out necessary reforms. Serguei Stanishev has concluded that a true democracy should be based on three main foundations: common values and ideas which are shared by the majority of the society; an efficient institutional framework; and a critical mass of public energy of support and participation.

What was clear in all the presentations is that democracy is above all seen as a *process*. Elena Nemirovskaya has paraphrased the words of Emmanuel Kant as follows: *“Today we do not live in the age of democracy but in the age of continuing democratisation”*. This is especially true for the countries in transition who are currently undergoing the process of construction of their world of

2. Director and Founder of the Moscow School of Political Studies

3. Secretary General of the Council of Europe

4. Prime Minister of Bulgaria

justice, freedom and prosperity. Alexander Orlov⁵ also views democracy as a process – as a “*process of learning, tolerance, mutual respect and the acceptance of the Other; it is a process of constant change; if not, it degenerates towards a form of a totalitarian democracy. A successful democracy is a result of collective work of all forces of the nation – those who are in power and those in opposition*”. Democracy thus is rightly considered as a “*form of social contract accepted through the process of deliberation*”. There is no absolute model for democracy. Rather than seek an absolute model, each state should build a democracy that is in balance with their national values, and which takes into account their national history and traditions. Ambassador Orlov underlined the importance of the Moscow School of Political Studies in the training of the new generation of leaders of the Russian Federation whose future work will be based on the core values of democracy, freedom, justice and tolerance.

According to Serguei Stanishev, the democratisation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe cannot be discussed apart from the context of their relations with the European Union and apart from the issues of European integration and enlargement. The progress achieved in these countries during the last decade is tremendous, yet there are still serious problems, such as the lack of transparency, poor participation, corruption, and people’s disillusionment in politics. Frustration and anger often lead to populism and ‘easy solutions’ such as putting the blame for the societal problems on one part of the population such as the immigrants. Such solutions however never deal with the real cause of the disease. Serguei Stanishev has established two different diagnoses for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and those from Western Europe: while the former often suffer social and economic hardships because of the radical changes and rapid transformation, the latter suffer from their fear of change. While in the late 1980s, the European idea was mainly identified with Western Europe – the EU and the Scandinavian countries, nowadays the geographic borders of the European idea have been broadened. Since late 1980s the Council of Europe has grown from 23 to 46 states and the EU from 15 to 25 states.

The institutions of the EU, however, have not undergone the changes necessary to match these political developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The institutional crisis and over-technocratisation of the EU may be dangerous since the distance between the EU and its citizens is increasing. The failed referenda on the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands are the most evident signs of the growing “enlargement fatigue” in Europe. Despite these dangers, the PM of Bulgaria still remains positive about both the widening and the deepening of the EU. His response to these problems is “more Europe, not less”. The European integration has been a “powerful catalyst of change” in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and “*It would have been difficult*”, Serguei Stanishev believes, “*to impose the unpopular reforms without the prospect of membership*”. Therefore, the enlargement is considered as “*a success and the right reply of Europe to global changes*”. When it comes to the institutional remedies for the EU, he proposed more pan-European policies in fields of research and development, energy as well as external relations and security in order to render the EU more competitive on the global arena as well as for it to be able to ensure security and stability on the European continent. More information on the purposes of the European Constitution and public education on European values are needed in order to gain public support and attention. A pro-active approach on the part of the European Commission as well as the member states is necessary to carry out the project of the European Constitution, which Serguei Stanishev considers as a “working compromise” for the soon-to-be Europe of twenty-seven. Finally, he believes that all too often the Europe of today – the Europe of peace and co-operation – is taken for granted by the younger generations, who forget that sixty years ago Europe lay in ruins.

5. Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Russia to the Council of Europe on behalf of the Russian Federation Chair of the Committee of Ministers

Bruno Gain⁶ and Pascal Mangin⁷ both refer to the city of Strasbourg as the ‘capital of Europe’, hosting multiple European institutions such as the Council of Europe, the Court of Human Rights, the European Parliament, the Euro Corps and now the Summer University for Democracy. Having lived a tragic and stormy history, Strasbourg has always been considered as a symbol of peace and reconciliation, always remaining positive about Europe and the European idea. “The Europe of Strasbourg” is the Europe of democracy and human rights. In the face of the problems facing the Europe of today, as Ambassador Gain believes, Strasbourg can provide two main remedies – action in the form of concrete projects and the opportunity of dialogue, which is also the main purpose of the Summer University for Democracy: *“The worst enemy of Europe is silence since it allows misunderstandings to be born. The Summer University offers a unique opportunity to speak, to engage in dialogue and to discuss our common values in order to build a true space of democracy with a grand vision for our Grande Europe”*. Pascal Mangin invited all participants of the University to seek inspiration in Strasbourg in the moments of doubts and be the “ambassadors of Strasbourg and of the Europe of Strasbourg” in the world.

6. Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the Council of Europe on behalf of the host country of the Council of Europe

7. Deputy Mayor, Strasbourg

III. New Challenges to democracy and human rights in today's Europe

"We should not only fight hard, we should also fight smart and fair. The fight against terrorism must not resort to measures which undermine the very values it seeks to protect and the very values that terrorism seeks to destroy"

Maud de Boer-Buquicchio⁸

What are the challenges for democracy in the 21st century? Vladimir Lukin⁹ has chosen six major ones, around which to build the general discussion of the first plenary session that took place in the afternoon on July 10. The first challenge, prioritised also by Ms de Boer-Buquicchio, concerns the very essence of democracy – people's *participation* in politics. Now many European countries face the problems of low election turnout, people's low interest in politics as well as growing support for populism. Often, as Vladimir Lukin explains, the interest in politics is low because the actual processes of the reconciliation of multiple interests occur outside the very structures and institutions of democracy, and democracy then becomes nothing more than a "*skeleton without meat, and what is worse, without a head*".

Annelise Oeschger¹⁰ and Svetlana Smirnova¹¹ believe that successful democracy building depends to a great extent on the active participation of civil society in political life. Annelise Oeschger was proud to say that for the first time in history, an international organisation – the Council of Europe – has changed the consultative status of INGOs, which has existed since 1952, to participatory status in 2003. Thus, the Conference of INGOs, that consists of 372 INGOs, now constitutes the fourth pillar of the Council of Europe, in addition to the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, and is able to contribute to the elaboration of new programmes and legal instruments as well as to take initiatives on their own such as the monitoring of the application of the European Social Charter in the member states of the Council of Europe. Svetlana Smirnova, on her part, underlined the role of civil society in the democracy-building process in the Russian Federation calling for the transfer of more state functions to civil society and for the widening of the NGO networks. According to her, the international monitoring of the state of human rights in Russia provides the guarantee of not returning towards the totalitarian regime.

The second challenge for democracy is indeed *globalisation*. Namely, in the context of globalisation the number of "subjects of democracy" is increasing – nowadays in addition to the states, the subjects of democracy also include regions, as well as supranational and international organisations such as the EU, the Council of Europe or the UN. The third challenge prioritised by Vladimir Lukin refers to the obstacles to the *freedom of movement* of persons. In Europe globalisation and the initial opening of borders have led to the changes in the ethnic composition of various regions, and subsequently resulted in stricter immigration policies. Today, the EU is often criticised for becoming "fortress Europe" surrounded by the Schengen wall. Globalisation is closely linked with the fourth challenge discussed by Vladimir Lukin – *new technologies* and above all the Internet. In its early days, democracy used to be direct; later it became representational and bureaucratised. With the new technologies and the Internet, democracy once again may bring citizens closer to the

8. Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe

9. Commissioner on Human Rights of the Russian Federation

10. President of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe

11. Member of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

government. However, the other side of the coin is that there are also more opportunities for the misuse of democracy – for instance by extremist movements.

Terrorism has been listed by most of the participants as one of the most serious threats to democracy in the world. The dangers for democracy come both directly from terrorists' actions and indirectly from the reactions of the democratic countries, which sometimes neglect human rights in the name of the fight against terrorism. As Maud de Boer-Buquicchio has eloquently said, "*We should not only fight hard, we should also fight smart and fair. The fight against terrorism must not resort to measures, which undermine the very values it seeks to protect and the very values that terrorism seeks to destroy. For a state to react in such a way is to fall into the trap set by terrorism for democracy*". The work of the Council of Europe has been directed at working out the practical guidelines for the measures fighting terrorism, which have already received large approval in the UN. Terrorism often "wins" as a result of self-fulfilling prophecy: by saying that some country is not democratic, terrorists justify their attacks, which in their turn sometimes provoke undemocratic responses, which in the end help terrorists to prove their point. In order to quit this vicious circle, the fight against terrorism should follow the norms and standards based on democratic values.

The fifth problem concerns the institutional reform of the UN Security Council in connection to the principles and conditions of *preventive action*. In Vladimir Lukin's viewpoint, the current conditions permitting a country to take preventive action – the need for self-defence and unanimity in the Security Council of the UN – are insufficient in the world, where the states are confronted with genocide and the nuclear threats. The inefficiency of the UN Security Council poses a serious threat to the democratic world of today and should be transformed to facilitate the decision-making process and to be able to take timely measures for conflict resolution – even if Zarko Puhovski¹² stated that conflict resolution remains an utopia, and "*we cannot avoid living with conflicts*". To him, one should rather speak about "conflict transformation", where the role of democracy is not to resolve conflicts but to lower the levels of violence.

The sixth challenge for democracy proposed by Vladimir Lukin is about integrating democratic ideas on the one hand, and national *traditions*, on the other. Should democracy "*run faster than the world around it*", as Maud de Boer-Buquicchio has stated in her opening speech? Would not we find ourselves running away from reality? Democracy should not be imposed too rapidly on societies, especially on societies in transition. Instead, taking India as an ideal example, Vladimir Lukin believes that the slow process of merging the ideas of democracy with the national culture and traditions is more likely to bring about success and not the rejection of the democratic model as artificially imposed. "*There are no such traditions that contradict the principles of democracy*", says Vladimir Lukin, "*they may only slow down slightly <the process of democratisation>*". Although there has been strong criticism of the present state of democracy in the Russian Federation, Vladimir Lukin believes that Russia has undergone a tremendous process of transformation since the time of the Soviet Union. The existing problems such as growing xenophobia and re-centralisation are all part of the reaction to the rapid changes in the early 1990s. According to Svetlana Smirnova, "*democracy is not about permitting everybody to do everything*", which leads to "*utter chaos*", in which Russia has found itself in the mid-1990s. Democracy is first of all about the rule of law, and Russia is currently in the process of "*putting everything in order*".

While most of the panel participants discussed the new challenges for democracy, Zarko Puhovski in his thought-provoking presentation has drawn attention to the old challenges – have those been settled? For instance, discussing terrorism one should not forget, the old challenge of the state terror, where states still legitimise their illegitimate use of violence. According to him, democracy should not be seen as a perfect system of government, and decisions taken by majorities *can* be wrong. Likewise, democracy should not claim to make people better – as this often leads to the establishment of totalitarian regimes – but rather, democracy has to accept people the way they

12. President of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Croatia

are. In his somewhat Hobbesian view of mankind, Zarko Puhovski believes that democracy is there to tame conflict – social and international – and does not have to be overburdened with value systems. In fact, says Zarko Puhovski, favouring the causes of NGOs in politics is an *intervention* into democracy since the position of NGOs has no democratic legitimisation against all the others. Similarly, ethnic minorities are not protected *by* democracy but rather ethnic minorities may be said to be protected *against* democracy, thus being an example of positive discrimination. “*Democracy is about equality*”, says Zarko Puhovski, “*but sometimes it has a lower value, especially in places where equality did not use to be a tradition*”.

Besides, when discussing democracy in today's Europe, one should ask a question about the essence and the borders of Europe. Zarko Puhovski considers the ambiguity around the meaning of Europe as one of the main challenges for democracy in Europe today. If Europe is not a geographic concept, then it should be a “community of values”, based on the clear value criteria that are equally applicable to all. “*But how can this community of values have as a candidate state, which occupies a part of the territory of a member state?*” asks Zarko Puhovski, “*How can community of values accept member states like the Baltic States, where the rights of minorities are practically non-existent? How can community of values accept countries that do not meet <the established> criteria?*” Zarko Puhovski emphasised the problem of “double standards” in the EU enlargement process as the existence of these double standards undermines the very foundation and the very meaning of criteria. As one of the reactions to Zarko Puhovski's presentation, Alexander Lukichev¹³ for example agreed that the EU uses double standards since it cannot work out the common foreign policy to manage various regional conflicts. The issue of different membership criteria of the EU and the Council of Europe has also been mentioned. Maud de Boer-Buquicchio has underlined that although the Council of Europe is “*an organisation in its own right and not just a waiting room for the EU*”, fulfilling the obligations of the Council of Europe brings the countries closer to the EU.

Another speaker from the audience, Oleksandr Bohutsky¹⁴ has brought up another “old challenge” for democracy that remains important in today's Europe – corruption of leaders. David Berzeshvili¹⁵ has also mentioned the lack of the elite renewal, which cannot but hinder the process of active transformation. The formation of new national elites who cherish the ideas of democracy and human rights is precisely the task of the Schools of Political Studies. The Summer University for Democracy and the Council of Europe may also contribute to the formation of valuable international networks and mutual understanding among the representatives and future leaders of different countries.

The Conference “New Challenges to Democracy and Human Rights in Today's Europe” was followed by two series of workshops. The first series of workshops, “Lessons to be drawn from democratic processes: the challenge of participation” concentrated on the issues of civil society, democratic deficit and electoral participation. The second series of workshops, “Democracy and the challenge of diversity” focused on the topics of social cohesion and social inclusion as well as democratic pluralism and the freedom of expression.

13. Chairman, Vologda City Duma, Russia

14. Director-general of the International commercial broadcasting company “ICTV”, Kiev

15. Member of the Parliament of Georgia

1. Lessons to be drawn from democratic processes: the challenge of participation

a. Civil society against democratic deficit?

Citizen participation is the essence of democracy as it legitimises those who govern. “Democratic deficit” is the concept that came into use in the context of the EU institutions and their lack of proximity to the citizens – in other words, the lack of legitimacy. Yet, nowadays one can speak of democratic deficit in most of the countries of both Western Europe and those in the post-Soviet space, where people’s trust in political institutions and participation in politics are low. Participation takes various forms – from taking part in the elections to mobilising and uniting into associations, think tanks and non-profit organisations to fight for a cause, to generate new ideas or simply to resolve common social problems with joint efforts. These alternative forms of participation constitute the basis of civil society.

In some of the countries that undergo transition, civil society may become the driving force of democratisation. In others, civil society may need national and international support to develop after the initial processes of transformation. The very notions and components of “civil society” as well as “democratic deficit” may be perceived differently in different countries. It were the two Schools of Political Studies – “Ovidiu Șincai” European School from Bucharest and European Institute for Political Studies from Chisinau – that discussed these issues in a joint workshop on July 11¹⁶. Among the questions discussed were the questions concerning the forms and patterns of organisation of civil society, the means by which civil society can gain democratic legitimacy, the existence of legal frameworks supporting the development of civil society in the countries under transformation, as well as the nature of the relationship between civil society and political circles.

As for the meaning of civil society, the moderator of the Bucharest workshop Karin Nordmeyer¹⁷ explained that civil society does not comprise all of the nation but service providing groups (NGOs) and other advocacy groups. She stresses that involvement in politics does not solely mean belonging to a party, but in more general terms, “*feeling responsible about what is going on*”. The issue of the spheres of action of NGOs and especially the nature of their relationship with politics was the dominant topic of discussion throughout the workshop. Some Romanian participants mentioned that in young democracies, NGOs try to influence national politics at the risk of becoming overly political. Others explained this fact saying that Romania has had a peculiar “landscape of transition”: namely, while in other countries civil society has appeared before democratisation, in Romania civil society was born after the revolution, where NGOs were perceived as a “guerrilla army” for political parties. One participant said, “*In Romania credibility of NGOs is very low. Among the reasons is a brutal involvement in politics, as most of the “dirty work” in politics is done by NGOs and there are also NGOs used for money laundering and enrichment of some individual*”. Yet, other participants believe that the distinction between political and social is almost impossible to make and therefore there should be no limits to the NGOs’ participation in politics “*as long as the rules of the democratic game are clear*”.

NGOs however should not “*help political parties to make their point*”, argues Karin Nordmeyer, “*but rather they should provide expertise to decision-makers, expertise that is based on everyday life experience of the people*”. Another participant stressed the positive role NGOs have played in the democratisation process in Romania: “*Of course, things are happening but this is because of the transition from a closed to an open system. In the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, things are settling in a more difficult manner. However, civil society in Romania and in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe has had a very important role during the last 16 years. Apart from the important contribution of NGOs to democratisation there were also some marginal phenomena as those previously mentioned. Probably this was due to a too permissive*

16. To be further referred to as ‘Bucharest’ and ‘Chisinau workshops’

17. President of Unifem Germany

legislation. To improve legislation we must ensure transparency (especially concerning financing) and also assess the degree of representativity of these institutions. Without rules, principles and values we cannot prevent it". The dialogue between the State and civil society may take time and effort to develop, and the support from the international organisations is essential. Thus, for instance, the Council of Europe has helped to work out a concept of co-operation between the Parliament, the Government and NGOs in the Republic of Moldova. As for the government support, Karin Nordmeyer explains, it is often clear from the legislation and the required NGO registration procedures whether the government supports or hinders the development of civil society. While NGOs in Moldova, Romania or Russia have to be registered with the Ministry of Justice, in Germany, an NGO only has to register with the local authorities and in Switzerland it does not have to register at all.

The question of financial transparency of NGOs has also been widely debated. Some of the participants proposed to create a new law on transparency of NGO funding, similar to the legislation on the funding of political parties, which is essential to the existence and public image of NGOs since they enjoy the tax-free status. Although there exist no legislative frameworks as to whether and how NGOs should account for their sources, there are ethical standards that drive NGOs to be as open as possible about their sources of financing. The discussion also touched upon the question of protection of minority rights in Romania, and the European support and influence. Claudia Luciani¹⁸, has explained that the Council of Europe does not impose any rules on its Member States but provides standards and norms such as Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the European Convention of Human Rights and the Charter on Regional and Minority Languages. She pointed out that these instruments do not offer privileges to minorities – as some participants tended to think – but rather they stand for the inclusion of minorities: *"The instruments are meant to ensure that all groups that feel different should have a place in society"*. However, Europe cannot offer "magic formulas" to Romania or any other country; each country has to invent their own approach and the civil society should contribute to this process.

At the Chisinau workshop, the moderators Daniel Zielinski¹⁹ and Dorota Dakowska²⁰ have led the discussion along a slightly more theoretical path. Speaking about democratic deficit and citizen participation, Daniel Zielinski has elaborated the definition of what it means to be a citizen. In his view, a citizen is the person who has access to information, understands this information, has a critical attitude to this information and who can act. However, the reality of post-Soviet societies is far from the ideal picture. As one of the participants pointed out, in Moldova, citizen participation is extremely low, where 80% of the population finds it uninteresting to participate in politics, only 15% think they could turn to the government with a letter to solve a problem, and only 12% would engage in a protests. State-centrist, paternalist attitudes and "blind belief in leaders" are strong, with great expectations for the State; yet at the same time more than two thirds of the population are seriously dissatisfied with local governmental policies and the services provided by the State. Therefore, Dorota Dakowska poses a question – is there too little, or on the contrary, too much of the State? As if to argue the definition of the citizen by Daniel Zielinski, Dorota Dakowska believes that one should not invent "too an ideal notion of a citizen". Theoretically, democracy offers the opportunities for participation to everybody; yet only a small minority are interested in politics. Dorota Dakowska draws a parallel between countries of Central and Eastern Europe now and Western Europe in the 1970s, where 50% of the population were not at all and 35% were only slightly interested in politics. However, one cannot say that these people are not to be called citizens.

For a genuine democracy building, institutions and rules do not suffice; one needs an active network including different groups, organisations, and institutions, which should play the role of *"mediators between the state and its citizens, thus, making possible to control the increasing expansion-*

18. Directorate General of Political Affairs, Council of Europe

19. Delegate General, UNCCAS, Lille

20. Lecturer and researcher in political science, University of Paris X

ist attitude of the state". The representatives of the civil society such as NGOs should be responsible for providing the information about existing problems and the Government's policies. Civil society in Moldova, like in many other post-Soviet countries, is still underdeveloped; the number of NGOs who have the courage to promote their interests is insignificant. Similarly to the Romanian group, one Moldovan participant pointed out that in the difficult conditions of post-Soviet transition, many NGOs become tools of influence of political parties as well as religious groups. For instance, according to one participant, in Moldova, the two main Orthodox Churches, Catholic Church and the Evangelist-Baptist Church have they own NGO networks much the same way as political parties. At the same time, NGOs have bad relations with trade unions, as the latter have not undergone the shock of transition and remain rather "Soviet-like".

Thus, according to some participants, civil society should rather serve as a "protection screen" between the State and the citizens. Other participants, on the contrary, believe that the success of civil society depends on the close co-operation of NGOs with political parties – but only with the parties that are truly democratic. Daniel Zielinski, on his part, believes that while "protection screen" is too strong a word – there should not be any need for protection from the State in the first place – there is a need for a dialogue between the state and civil society. While the nature of relations between the State and civil society very much depends on the culture of a particular country, NGOs should be given basic consultative and participatory rights, as it has been done in the Council of Europe. According to Daniel Zielinski, there are three conditions for the successful development of civil society: favourable and simple legal framework, clear fiscal rules, and the existence of the common interest in society.

At the Bucharest workshop, Claudia Luciani underlined the importance of international networks and international support for the countries where civil society is still weak. Co-operation with the EU has a very positive impact on the processes of democratisation in general – this is why, as a political analyst from Moldova explained, Romania is already undergoing democratic consolidation, while Moldova is still "trapped in the stage of democratic stabilisation". As of today, the influence of the US in Moldova appears significantly stronger than that of Europe, since various American programmes have been introduced to Moldova earlier than their European counterparts, and since they are significantly less difficult to manage. With American financial support, also came American modes of work, norms and practices. While external financial support for civil society is indispensable, it can also lead to the competition among various NGOs for the external funding. As Karin Nordmeyer underlined, co-operation among NGOs is of extreme importance since uniting for a cause together, they can yield more power in their dialogue with the State.

b. Electoral participation

Bulgarian School of Politics and Yerevan School of Political Studies have debated a more classical type of citizen participation – participation in elections on July 11²¹. At the Sofia workshop, Serguei Kouznetsov²² started with most pertinent question – why is participation low in Europe? Historically, the right to vote was given to those with fortune and social status; gradually, especially after the World War II, voting rights became universal. "*Ideas develop permanently*", says Serguei Kouznetsov, "*but new problems appear: if people have this right, why are not they voting?*" Different electoral systems may have their impact on electoral participation. In some democracies, the right to vote is obligatory; yet, there exists a controversy whether it is truly democratic to impose voting on citizens, who go to election booths not of their own motivation but largely to avoid sanctions. At the same time, if electoral turnout is low, the legitimacy of the vote may be questioned, too. Surely, people's fading confidence towards the state and the increasing diversity of elections – local, regional, national and European - are also reflected in decreasing electoral participation.

21. To be further referred to as Sofia and Yerevan workshops

22. Council of Europe, Secretariat of Venice Commission

At the Yerevan workshop, Michael Remmert²³ on his part has outlined three clusters of possible barriers to electoral participation. First, electoral participation depends on the clear legislative and administrative frameworks. Here, the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters adopted by the Venice Commission for Democracy through Law at its 52nd session (Venice, October 18-19 2002) serves as a benchmarking instrument for electoral legislation in the Council of Europe Member States. The Code is based on five major democratic principles with regard to electoral participation: universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage. Albeit not legally binding, this instrument should serve as a reference for all democracies – young and old. Second, limited access of political parties and candidates to the media often results in low electoral participation. Here, Michael Remmert underlined the increasing role of new technologies and, in particular, e-voting and other forms of e-participation in mobilising certain parts of the population (e.g. young people and persons with reduced mobility). Similarly to Serguei Kouznetsov, Michael Remmert also mentioned the third important reason behind electoral abstention and political discontent – namely the decreasing confidence of the electorate. In order to prevent electoral participation from declining any further, *“the political elite needs to make a sustained effort to regain the confidence of the electorate. At the same time, the whole political system will have to give ordinary citizens more opportunities to freely express their political opinions.”*

Christian Saves²⁴ focused on electoral participation in Central and Eastern Europe. To him, electoral participation is a “long-term political investment” that subsequently brings political gains. In Central and Eastern Europe, electoral participation is essential to the processes of democratic consolidation being *“an instrument of progress and adjustment to peaceful, negotiated change”*. However, says he, it remains to be studied *“how, in their attempt to promote electoral participation as a political lever, the people can take their own destiny in hand and influence, orientate or even completely reverse the actions of those in power”*. Christian Saves believes that the massive embracing of the Western European socio-economic model by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe may be a result of the desire to *“break with the past and take one’s destiny in hand”*. In Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic, electoral participation *“was a way of expressing a clear popular choice, namely a strong desire for a democratic course, making it possible to adopt liberal institutions and fostering this process of democratic integration through a rapid accession to the EU, turning the latter into the main democratic incentive”*. Electoral participation may also be viewed as a *“way of orienting strategic and tactical goals of those in power”*. The emergence of more powerful public opinion, influencing public debate and social choices, has led to recent major changes in Serbia and Montenegro. As a result of street demonstrations in Serbia, where people longed to *“turn the page on the Milosevic years”*, the autocratic leader was forced to surrender his office. In Montenegro, a fine example of strong electoral participation was the referendum of spring 2006, where 55% of the population supported the independence of Montenegro. As Christian Saves explains, *“At one point or another, electoral participation will come along and ‘sanction’ political changes forcing leaders to take them into account (albeit against their will), from the moment they are subject to the increasing pressure of public opinion in a political setting which has become democratic and hence a competitive environment for politicians”*.

The participants of both Yerevan and Sofia workshops expressed their concern about the low electoral participation in their countries. Thus, one Armenian participant said that although the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia provides for just, direct and free elections, during the last ten years both countrywide and local government elections were not distinguished for high voter turnout, which did not exceed 55 per cent. Among the reasons for low electoral participation in Armenia, several were named. First, there is a lack of confidence towards the authorities and the state agencies, where people do not believe that his or her ballot would make a difference. Second, in Armenia, membership in a sect, which prohibits their members to participate in the elections, may partly account for low electoral participation. Other reasons include disabled people or citizens

23. Council of Europe, Directorate General of Political Affairs

24. Deputy Director of Studies, Ecole Nationale d'Administration

abroad, who for different reasons (e.g. lack of registration or fairness of the consulate services) fail to vote. Last but not least, some participants mentioned that democratic traditions are not deeply rooted in people's mentality. Yet, even the established democracies cannot boast high electoral participation, and thus, may hardly serve as ideal models for the countries in transition.

Electoral participation should be the guardian of the main principles of democracy – political pluralism and alternation in government. Not only do voters have to choose strategic orientation for their countries; they also have the right to choose new leaders. Unfortunately, old democracies of Western Europe such as France or Italy today serve as “bad examples of democracy” also because of the longevity of political careers of politicians, which often last for 40-50 years. France for instance has passed legislation limiting the possibilities for mandate accumulation but poses no restriction on the number of successive terms that a politician may serve as a mayor or an MP. As a result, says Christian Saves, political system in these countries “*becomes fossilised, leading to inefficiency, corruption, discontent and indifference, if not, ultimately, unspoken hostility*”. Partly, the blame also rests with the voters, who continue voting for the same politicians “*who have been around too long and have failed in their endeavours with clockwork regularity*”. Electoral turnover and the discipline of politicians' behaviour greatly depend on the participation and mobilisation of the public, but also of the party activists. The latter have opportunity, by means of the internal party elections, designating appropriate candidates and choosing party leaders, to bring “new blood” into politics.

Among various techniques to increase electoral participation two were discussed – voter information and affirmative action. Reaching out to the voter and especially to the young generation via the press, the Internet, and email is an important task. Thus, it was mentioned that in Armenia only 37.5 per cent of the youth vote, and that their role in the political parties is not yet sufficiently important. Affirmative action appeared a far more contestable concept, where the discussion mostly dwelt on the issue of women participation in politics. Thus, both in Bulgaria and Armenia women are still seriously underrepresented in political institutions. As one Bulgarian participant explained, only 23 per cent of the MPs in the Bulgarian Parliament are women, which falls below the UN requirement of 40 per cent. The legislation providing for equal rights may not be sufficient in the countries, where traditions and socially constructed stereotypes prevent women from taking an active part in politics. Thus, in Armenia, as it was mentioned, particularly in rural areas, women's role is limited to household functions. Quotas may be needed – at least during a certain period of time – in order to improve the situation and facilitate the entrance of women to the predominantly ‘masculine’ field of politics. Yet, in the course of the discussion at both workshops little positive was said about such measures of affirmative action, which were considered by participants as positive discrimination going against the democratic principles of equality.

2. Democracy and the challenge of diversity

a. Social cohesion and social inclusion as preconditions for the democratic process?

The representatives of the European Institute for Political Studies in Moldova discussed the subject of social cohesion on July 13, 2006. Alexandra Nacu²⁵, one of the workshop moderators, has launched the discussion with a question on the meaning of democracy dating back to Ancient Greece: is democracy a form of government – government of the people – or rather, a form of society which should be made in a certain manner so that it functions democratically? Aristotle has chosen the latter answer classifying different societies into those, which are more likely to function as democracies, aristocracies, or oligarchies. Democratic criteria pose a certain problem: many countries throughout centuries have been called democracies without giving voting rights to all people. Alexandra Nacu questions these criteria: democracy is the government of the people, but how in practice can one make people participate? How to represent and consult the people? Should various communities be given special rights?

The famous French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, was the first scholar to speak of social cohesion. Having noticed that at the beginning of the 20th century traditional forms of solidarity such as family and commune were losing their importance giving way to a more individualist society, Durkheim elaborated the question of possible linkages that could hold the society together. Alexandra Nacu believes social cohesion is essential for democracy for if a certain part of the population is excluded from democracy, one cannot speak of the veritable government of the people. The question of the rights and participation of minorities remains essential to democracy, which by its definition is supposed to be an inclusive form of government. Yet, in reality the law of majority results in the exclusion of minorities from political participation in many of democratic countries of today. Exclusion of minorities, says Alexandra Nacu, constitutes democratic deficit as it *“goes against equality and participation of citizens”*.

Jean-Marie Heydt²⁶ also touched upon the issue of inclusion and exclusion in democracy: *“Democracy is a form of participation in a certain space, but participation for whom?”* The notion of *city-zen-ship*, proposed by Jean-Marie Heydt, reflects his conviction in the necessity of the involvement in the local decision-making of all those who live in a certain community, pay taxes and participate culturally in the life of the community. In addition to the voters and the elected, decision-makers also include administration and experts, who prepare the legislation and possess competencies to solve complex issues. Thus, democracy today is not simply a matter of pure representation, but involves multiple non-representative decision-makers and remains in the constant tension between the majority rule and minority rights. Pointing to the recent street protests in France, Jean-Marie Heydt demonstrated how the democratically elected government had to change its decision *“without any real democratic debate such as referendum to know the people’s will”*, being under pressure of the voice of the street – which cannot be said to represent the whole nation.

The discussion also dwelt on the possible linkage between poverty and democracy. While some scholars and politicians claim that poor countries are less likely to develop into democracies, others, keeping in mind the example of India’s successful democratic development, believe that democracy itself is a factor of development. At the time of globalisation, the question of socio-economic preconditions of democracy becomes even more important because of the conflict between various scales: the trans-national scale of economic development and the scale of the nation-state that still keeps hold of political development.

Furthermore, corruption is an obstacle both to social cohesion and democracy. *“Corruption”*, says Alexandra Nacu, *“is anti-democratic simply because it is non-egalitarian and it favours the power in place; it cannot be justified as being the ‘oil’ facilitating the functioning of social mechanisms*

25. Lecturer and researcher, Institute of Political Studies (CERI), Paris

26. Vice-president of the INGO liaison committee, Council of Europe

as it inevitably reinforces the oligarchy”. Political scientists increasingly differentiate between the phenomena of *clientelism* and *corruption*, for unlike corruption, clientelism at the local level in some countries may facilitate the access of poor social groups to the sphere of politics, thus encouraging political participation. Jean-Marie Heydt pointed to the example of many African countries, which demonstrates that corruption is a “re-amplifying evil” – if it exists, it may only increase its proportions.

One participant discussed social capital and social cohesion, where the two notions were essentially opposed to each other. Social capital was defined as “*resource accumulation by a certain group or an individual, whereas resource accumulation inevitably results in the exclusion of other groups or individuals*”. Social cohesion, on the contrary, refers to equality and redistribution of social capital and allows “*the social categories that do not possess the social capital to take part in the society and in the political decision-making process*”. Citizen participation and equal voting rights for all social categories were seen as prerequisites for achieving social cohesion. Another participant discussed poor citizen participation in Moldova, explaining it with the fact that citizens are poorly informed and rarely consulted in the process of decision-making. It was mentioned that these problems exist even in the EU Member States, where the quality of the decision-making process is the responsibility of the “un-informed citizen”.

Until recently, poverty and exclusion in the EU countries have been the domains of the nation state, largely due to the subsidiarity principle. Yet, according to Jean-Marie Heydt, the EU and the Council of Europe have been increasingly taking measures strengthening social cohesion at the European level. While the EU method can be characterised as vertical where the EU creates criteria and decisions, which are then applied in the legislation of the member states, the Council of Europe is based on the horizontal, or intergovernmental mode of operation. Member states can always opt out and not incorporate the recommendations of the Council of Europe in their legislation (e.g. France has not accepted the Framework Convention for National Minorities). The goal of the Council of Europe is to assemble all the member countries around the table and to work out recommendations that are based on compatibility and similarities among all the 46 member states, rather than to impose unique standards (e.g. The European Code of Social Security). Such an approach is most fitting since there are profound differences in the number of the excluded and the poor in different European countries.

When it comes to the EU initiatives, the National Action Plans on Inclusion (PAN/Inclusion) encourage the development of the inclusive employment policy, the provision of adequate resources and revenues permitting decent living standards in different countries, the preservation of family solidarity and protection of children rights, the provision of access to quality services (e.g. health, transport, social and cultural services) as well as the development of regional programmes supporting least developed regions in the EU, to name but a few. Unlike many other EU programmes, the Programme PAN/Inclusion leaves significant freedom to the member states as for the preparation and implementation of the Action Plans. Yet, Jean-Marie Heydt has criticised the EU initiatives in the field of social cohesion for following a reactive logic, where action is taken “not to reproduce the mistakes”. The Council of Europe, on the contrary, acts to prevent these mistakes from happening in the first place. In his viewpoint, social cohesion is the responsibility of the society as a whole, not just of the State, social services or humanitarian association: “*One is passing from the welfare state to the welfare society, which will be much larger – not simply in the sense of economic society, but in the sense of the whole of society*”. Alexandra Nacu, however, appears rather sceptical as for the possible role of the EU in the promotion of social cohesion, which still belongs to the domain of the nation state: “*The EU can only compare and class states, and provide negative evaluations, but not more*”. She added that in any case, the new member states, where the situation is especially bleak, would be able to comply with the EU standards only symbolically.

During the discussion, some participants continued with the problem of low participation and the lack of trust in politicians among the people, and others raised the problem of the obligatory vote. Furthermore, the necessity of referenda in democratic countries was debated, where it was agreed

that the political culture of referenda depends on the traditions of a certain state. Thus, even though in Switzerland the referendum may be one of the most important voting mechanisms, it may not necessarily be appropriate in other countries. The reasons for these differences may be practical (e.g. the size of the country, the cost of the referendum, etc.) but also historical: for instance, while the history of Switzerland has been based on the principle of compromise and agglomeration (*"history of the people who wanted to do something together"*), the French state was constructed by means of annexation. In Switzerland, according to Jean-Marie Heydt, people can be consulted, as historically there exists the notion of individual responsibility for the future of one's country. Therefore, as he concludes, different countries in Central and Eastern Europe should work out their own model of democracy basing on their history and traditions, and not copy in a blind fashion the experience of the Western countries.

b. Democratic pluralism and freedom of expression

In democratic societies, the media is meant to be a powerful actor – politically independent and financially transparent; yet, often the media serves as a powerful tool for the ruling political and economic elites. The problems of media and the freedom of speech were discussed during the workshops of "Ovidiu Șincai" European School from Bucharest, Bulgarian School of Politics, and Yerevan School of Political Studies on July 13²⁷. The Bucharest workshop was opened with a true story told by Saso Ordanovski²⁸: *"In one of the States in the US, local media finds out that the father of the leader of the local fascist party is a Jew. The journalists call the person, who confirms this fact yet promises to kill himself if the story will be run on the television. Despite the warning, the TV runs the story in the prime time, only to find out the next morning that the person has hanged himself"*. He asked the workshop participants the following question: *"Is the story more important than a life?"* This provocative question opened the discussion on the nature and the purposes of the media in general: is journalism about truth? According to Saso Ordanovski, journalism is only about facts: *"Any fact can be interpreted in many different ways; truth is reached by the public"*. He pointed to the three important crises of the media all over the world: the crisis of self-confidence, where journalists do not know whether they should provide facts or advocate different causes; the crisis of people's fading trust in the media; and the crisis of content, or increasing 'tabloidisation' of the media. In addition, the lack of transparency and the corruption of journalists and media owners pose an important problem: *"It used to be so that the media was there to report on business; today the media ARE the business"*. Renaud de la Brosse²⁹ believes that the media today represent the fourth power, besides the legislative, executive and juridical powers since *"without the media support any access to power is now impossible"*. Yet, rather than speak about the independence of the media, he prefers to focus on the media pluralism, which allows people to form their opinions on the basis of the existing multiple sources of information.

Media pluralism alone, however, does not mean quality information. Thus, some workshop participants noted that in the transition countries such as Romania or «the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia», the number of national and local TV channels has grown significantly during the recent years; yet many of them represent the so-called "party television" not being able to earn any money without certain sources of support. One Romanian participant even suggested, *"Maybe the very existence of a large number of such channels tries to hide incorrect and incomplete information, as we have so much data that we stop believing it"*. The media in the post-communist countries appear to be disconnected from the market economy, distraught with poor quality programmes and political propaganda. The media pluralism is being threatened by a number of other actions such as retaliation against "independent minded" journalists of the public sector; attacks and pressures against journalists of independent media; cancellation of existing laws to takeover the media, and formation of printing and broadcasting monopolies for the written press, TVs and radios, to name but a few. The Romanian journalists, present at the workshop, regretted that the journalist

27. To be further referred to as Bucharest, Sofia and Yerevan workshops accordingly.

28. Journalist, Director of Forum plus, Macedonia

29. Senior Lecturer, University of Reims, France

associations in their country are not sufficiently powerful to condemn the abusive practices and to fight politicians and oligarchs, who have both money and power. Several participants raised the issue of the control that businesspersons have over most of the local media. Yet, it was not seen as a problem concerning the freedom of expression or the credibility of the press but rather as a matter of political orientation and financial transparency. In the course of the discussion, the participants have supported the creation of more rigorous legislation both at the national and European levels to promote the transparency of the media financing and to fight against the concentration of various media – newspapers, TV and radio – in the hands of one company or one political party.

At the Sofia workshop, moderated by Bogdan Bogdanov³⁰ and Pall Thorhallsson³¹, the discussion dwelt on the issues of regulation and self-regulation of the media as a necessary condition for democracy. Speaking of various factors conditioning effective journalistic expression in Bulgaria, Bogdan Bogdanov differentiated between the external and internal factors. The external factors are well known: freedom of speech and the absence of the state or party interference or intimidation. Yet, according to Bogdan Bogdanov, it is the internal factors that pose the biggest problem in the Bulgarian society, where *auto-censorship*, the heritage of the communist regime, has become a permanent behaviour in media and has led to the development of the “*yellow or tabloid approach that seeks the sensational rather than the public*”. According to Professor, concrete problems are not named at all or are discussed only in general terms: “*An essential rule for getting of auto-censorship is to name, both in our minds and verbally, the problem that concerns us. Further, when there is a problem, we have to depict it in more not just a few words, which can cause action. Getting rid of auto-censorship means getting rid of a generally formulated questions*”. Other participants also pointed to the absence of the well-developed civil society in Bulgaria and the lack of the tradition of addressing political issues. A deeper problem may consist in the fact that public opinion and the media can rarely lead to any consequences.

Another part of the discussion concerned the responsibility and impartiality of the media. One participant noted that until recently there were only very low criteria in Bulgaria of what is admissible in the media. According to him, the age of the tabloid is soon coming to its end and there is a niche for serious journalism appearing. The only responsibility of the media is moral responsibility, and politicians are believed to provide moral standards and control: “*We, the politicians, are the ones to seek this moral responsibility. Very often certain journalists are trying to impose certain viewpoints and the politicians, who can set the standards of moral responsibility, have to stand up and ask the media - this is what you said three months ago, and this was what you said a year ago*”. Speaking of moral standards of the media, Bogdan Bogdanov added that Bulgaria is only “*in the process of building the moral norm of the Bulgarian politician*”. Often, the media may apply moral standards to various politicians in a very arbitrary form: “*It is said that the current Minister of Education has a mistress. Having a mistress is perceived as normal in our society; the Bulgarian society is completely indifferent when a man has a mistress, but it comes to politicians, one starts questioning this moral norm. Paradoxically, it is permissible if the Minister is a good one. If he or she is not good and has a mistress, then the reaction will be different.*”

In his speech, Pall Thorhallsson described the activities of the Council of Europe in the sphere of the media, which involve working out conventions and recommendations that deal with the importance of public service broadcasting in democratic societies, children protection against harmful content on the Internet, and the rights of journalists to protect their sources of information, among others. In addition to recommendations and conventions, the Council of Europe carries out the monitoring of compliance together with the help of the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers in order to see whether and how member states provide sufficient protection of the freedom of speech. Various co-operation and assistance programmes of the Council of Europe provide advice to the member states’ governments as for the legislation on the media as

30. Professor, President of the New Bulgarian University

31. Directorate General II – Human rights, Media Division

well as support with journalist training. The basis of the legal framework on the media is Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which apart from protecting the freedom of expression also sets out the conditions, under which it is allowed to restrict the freedom of expression in democratic countries. The need for regulations in the media depends on particular countries: for instance in his own home country, Iceland, the media recognise certain ethical standards, while this may not be the case elsewhere. Some participants from the Sofia workshop strongly criticised the situation of the media in certain Council of Europe member states, notably in Russia but also in France and Italy, as well as the inability of the Council of Europe to exercise influence on its member states. Pall Thorhallsson admitted that the Council of Europe is having big problems getting its message across and raising interest in the journalist community and official circles in Russia. He however concluded on a positive note, *“In the long term our work will be fruitful although it may be difficult in the short term. If a country gets condemned time and time again for the lack of press freedom, there will be changes made”*.

Hugues Jardel³², the moderator of the Yerevan workshop, focused on the lack of transparency of the media as another major problem for journalists in France and elsewhere. The Armenian participants noted that although there are nearly 60 private TV companies in Armenia, *“it is not the legal status that is important but rather who stands behind these TV companies and how they influence the content of their programs”*. The participants mentioned that during the first years of Armenia's independence, the newspapers reflected the views of various political parties; eventually, free non-partisan press started to develop. Certainly this does not mean that the media are independent: *“In Armenia, newspapers surely cannot be closed, but no journalist has a guarantee that their safety will be secured during journalistic investigations or that the persons using violence against journalists would be punished”*. In France, although to a lesser extent, the media are also subdued to political pressure, as has been demonstrated by one participant who referred to the scandal about firing of the editor-in-chief of *France Dimanche* for publishing a story on the French Minister of the Interior and his wife. The presidents of public media groups in France are appointed by the public authority, and the procedure should be made more transparent: *“In France”*, says one participant, *“each appoints their own friends in an unilateral manner”*. Financial difficulties of the media were also discussed. For instance, the Franco-German TV channel ARTE as well as most of the French public TV channels experience significant financial difficulties in keeping their offices in various parts of the world and preparing complex journalist investigations. Private channels may have sufficient funding yet they have to choose their subjects according to the interests of the audience, which Hugues Jardel considers as a form of “economic censure”. Thus, as was made clear at the Yerevan workshop, the lack of media independence and financial transparency remains a significant problem not only in the countries of the post-communist transition but also in the oldest democracies of Western Europe.

32. Deputy Editor in Chief, ARTE, Strasbourg

IV. European strategies: joint action, present and future

“The future Europe could not be the Europe of a transfer from West to East; it could only be the Europe of synthesis”

Adrian Severin³³

The future of Europe and the European strategies of the present were the main themes of the second plenary session held on July 11. The chair of the panel, Bernard Schreiner³⁴ greeted all the participants with the words of encouragement in their complex task to “*make our Europe evolve towards the future of peace, prosperity and liberty*” through discussion and dialogue. Once again, the city of Strasbourg, the symbol of peace and the Franco-German reconciliation, was warmly thanked for its hospitality and support as well as for evoking the essential democratic values of tolerance, respect for difference and dialogue. For Bernard Schreiner, in the epoch of the amazing technological progress, which reduces the importance of distance and time, the main challenge for Europe and for the rest of the world is preventing the rise of extremist movements and to avoid the war among ideologies. To meet these challenges, political elites have to listen and respond to the will of the people and to facilitate the development of participatory democracy and civil society, which is an important challenge in itself.

Adrian Severin, the moderator of the panel, continued discussion in the same vein, pointing to the widening gap of misunderstandings between the political elites and the people in most of the European democracies: “*All our countries are facing a ‘democratic fatigue’; our national democracies are tired and they have lost their capacity to inspire the people, mobilise them and let them support our initiatives. <...> Without that inspiration, without that kind of link we cannot consolidate the indispensable relationship between the leaders and the people*”. Civil society should not simply represent political opposition, as often is the case in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe; more than that, civil society should be the main partner of political elites – a partner to which political elites should be accountable in their actions. The election turn-out in many of the European countries may be low, and people may have lost trust in politicians; yet – and Adrian Severin remains positive evoking the famous words by Winston Churchill – democracy is the worst except all other ways to organise the society, or in other words, the best.

In addition to “democratising our national democracies”, Adrian Severin proposed to amend international law and to democratise international relations, which in his view may be defined as a “post bi-polar *disorder*” or as a form of “Orwellian” democracy where some are more equal than others. Further, the trans-national democracy that the European Union and the Council of Europe are trying to build is only an emerging system, an embryo, which is yet to be born. The ‘No’ to the European Constitution in the French and Dutch referenda demonstrated that political elites of these countries have failed to mobilise their population for the sake of Europe creating misunderstandings at home and blocking the creation of the political Europe that would be better structured and institutionalised. As Bernard Schreiner mentioned, European democracies – old and new – are in great need of leadership and vision: “*We should not be in doubt, we should not ‘Hamletise’ – to be or not to be a political Europe. No, political Europe is possible, and because it is possible, it is a must, and because it is a must, it should be, it must be possible*”.

33. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Romania

34. Vice-President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

The plan D – democracy, dialogue, and debate – was launched by the European Commission in December 2005 in order to rethink EU policies and ways of governance. It envisions promoting a more intensive debate with the population on the necessary institutional adjustments of the EU in the context of the future enlargement. As Michel Caillouët³⁵ explained, firstly, the plan D envisions reviving European democracy and contributing to the formation of genuine public opinion, where European citizens have access to information and tools that permit them to take an active part in the European decision-making process. In addition to the all-European debates between the EU institutions and the EU citizens, the plan D has the ambition to organise vast national debates all over the EU covering the domains such as the development of the economic and social Europe, the future construction of Europe or the role of the EU on the international arena. Secondly, the plan D promotes citizen participation in the democratic process. The European Commission has increasingly used Internet consultations of the citizens about green and white papers.

Still, one needs to improve the instruments that permit having the feedback expressing the voice of the European citizens. The European Commission's programme "Citizens for Europe" for instance has encouraged the establishment of the citizens' panels, which represent citizens from different regions and countries and which help to improve decision-making mechanisms at the regional level. The transparency of decisions is also being improved: for instance all the debates of the Council on the issues subject to the co-decision procedure with the European Parliament have been made public and accessible on the Internet. Finally, the plan D attempts to stimulate electoral participation, which is often very weak in all kind of elections – local, national or European. According to Michel Caillouët, the first results of the plan D were rather encouraging: national debates have demonstrated that many citizens consider the action on the EU level essential and that there are important expectations – although often unsatisfied – concerning the improvement of EU actions. However, there also exists a perception that the manner in which the EU functions too often diminishes the efficiency of the EU policies. European citizens appear to be more critical of the functioning manner of the EU rather than its policies as such. According to Michel Caillouët, the plan D will not come to an end along with the reflection period on the European Constitution but will develop the dialogue between the EU institutions and citizens on the long-term basis.

Most of the panel participants mentioned the EU enlargement as one of the most important European challenges in the future along with necessary institutional reforms. François Heisbourg³⁶ spoke about the EU as the "normative empire", which may be enlarged when its norms appear "appetising" to outsiders. The norms of the EU, according to François Heisbourg, constitute its "genetic code" enshrined in the founding Treaties of Rome. These norms as well as the subsequent Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice enable the widening of the EU, yet they do not provide sufficient mechanisms for deepening the political union and establishing well-functioning governance structures. Indeed, the existence of political Europe and its *demos* is still in its early day – European identity still comes second to national identity. Without a strong political union and without a new EU treaty or Constitution, the EU would have difficulties managing crises and formulating its strategies: "*transparency, communication and the need to develop the EU not as a normative empire but as a political actor, all the while remaining in the spirit of the founding fathers*" remain among the most important tasks for Europe.

Another important challenge for Europe is defining its own borders and promoting democracy not just in the EU member states but also everywhere on the continent. As Gennadiy Druzenko³⁷ pointed out during the question session, "*Why is the European Union still debating on the limits of Europe, while the Council of Europe, representing 46 European states, has known these limits all along?*" Adrian Severin underlined the importance of an inclusive concept of Europe, even though certain countries such as Russia may remain outside the EU borders for the sheer reasons of size. He believes that both the Council of Europe and the EU should work together in order to build "*two*

35. Ambassador, Representative of the European Commission to the Council of Europe

36. Special Adviser to the Strategic Institute, Paris

37. Legal Counsellor, Vice-President of the European Integration Institute, Kiev

European houses on the same foundations of democracy and human rights". The terms of "Wider Europe" or "larger confederation" are often used to speak about the EU and its neighbours. Since much was said on the limits of Europe and the future of the Europe-Russia relations in particular, Mikhail Margelov³⁸ described the nature of the EU-Russian relations from Russia's point of view. According to him, Russia does not want to become the member of the EU not only because of its size, as Adrian Severin had said, but also since it wants to have its own role on the Eurasian continent. In the estimate of Mikhail Margelov, the nature of the relations between the EU and Russia may follow two trajectories: partnership along with a certain degree of integration, or peaceful co-existence. While the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Russia expires in 2007, there is a great need to determine the future of this relationship. Much of the present day dialogue between the EU and Russia is overshadowed with mutual misunderstandings and Russia's acute reactions to the EU criticisms.

The discourse on Russia's "return to Europe" is counterbalanced with the discourse on the "conflict of values", which in Mikhail Margelov's point of view, is being artificially constructed by both sides: *"on the one hand by Eurocentrists, and on the other hand by the part of the Russian elite with an 'island mentality', unwilling to study foreign languages and suffering from their complexes of both uniqueness and inferiority"*. The complex nature of the EU-Russia relations was summed up in the following: *"From the EU side, we are being offered norms packaged into the examples of double standards, usual in politics; from our side, there are threats to ignore the international law, references to our uniqueness, claims about the crisis of the EU. But as history – the year 1917 – has shown, it is very easy to shut the window to Europe, while to open it during one or even fifteen years is a rather difficult task"*. Indeed, the value barrier is an artificial construction and the Russian people can only benefit from embracing such values as the respect for human rights, tolerance, or free and fair elections. The only categories of the Russian society positioning themselves against those values are political elites *"that dream of isolationism and those officials who are in bed with business criminals"*. Yet, Mikhail Margelov remains positive: *"I believe these categories will outlive themselves as the Russian people cannot again be turned into the lonely crowd of the times of the so-called 'advanced socialism'. <...>Russia is a European country; it is of course the East, but the East of Europe"*.

The only woman panellist at the conference, Yoko Iwama³⁹, spoke about the history of the relations between Europe and Japan, which are characterised by the consistent transfer of European economic and political experience to Japan ever since the 19th century. Due to its history of learning and modernisation, Japan more than any other country understands the challenges that lie ahead of many Central and East European countries. Being the only Asian country with the status of observer at the Council of Europe, Japan also provides significant bilateral aid to the European countries in transition, thus promoting democracy in the Council of Europe member states. Jacques Paul Klein⁴⁰ explained the role of another international organisation in addressing challenges in different parts of the world, the UN. In the face of recent criticisms of the UN, he defended the UN as the best mechanism that can provide collective security in the world. *"More than any other document"*, says Jacques Paul Klein, *"the United Nations Charter represents the common understanding of mankind of the principles that should govern international relations in support of human dignity. It comprises the universality of legal and moral authority"*. In addition to the moral authority of the United Nations Charter, the UN possesses the unparalleled administrative experience in peacekeeping missions with almost 90,000 personnel serving on four continents. Furthermore, the UN Peacekeeping is effective and possesses the most suitable institutional framework for nation-building missions, *"one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of international legitimacy"*. Finally, the UN's multi-

38. Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of Russia

39. Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo

40. Former Under Secretary General of the United Nations and Chief of Mission of United Nations Operations in Croatia (UNTAES), Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIB) and Liberia (UNMIL)

ethnic and multi-national nature is itself an asset, as “*many of these nations have themselves suffered ethnic conflict and have found the path to reconciliation and democracy*”.

The challenges facing Europe and the rest of the world are multiple: from strengthening participatory democracy and reforming the EU institutions, to promoting democracy and peace everywhere in the world. Jacques Paul Klein has concluded his speech with inspiring words: “*I firmly believe that we are among a small handful of states that can turn diversity into strength. My hope is that we are nations constructed of ideals – not of race, ancestry or inherited class. What should make our countries – often with no common religion, with people of different races, nationalities, ethnic origins and even ideologies – work? It is our fundamental belief in the rights of the individual and the protection of those individual rights under the rule of law*”. It is on this foundation of democracy and human rights that Adrian Severin, on his part, wishes to build a wider Europe, the two European houses consisting of the EU member states and those who for various reasons remain outside. In conclusion, he identified four main problems for this wider Europe – which he preferred to call in a more positive tone as “opportunities to be solved”: strengthening European identity, encouraging leadership, boosting economic growth and working towards a more cohesive Europe.

The conference “European strategies: joint action, present and future” was followed by two series of workshops. The first series of workshops “Joint analysis and action as a means of fostering integration” concentrated on the issues of identity and citizenship as well as possible model(s) of social and economic integration. The second series of workshops “European security and defence” discussed political frameworks for European security and defence and the problem of energy security in Europe.

1. Joint analysis and action as a means of fostering integration

a. Identity and Citizenship

The Tbilisi School of Political Studies discussed the issues of identity and citizenship at the workshop held on July 13. The workshop was launched by a joint presentation by Mary-Ann Hennessey⁴¹ and Bruno Cautrès⁴² explaining the complex notions of identity and citizenship and outlining the main norms and standards of the Council of Europe concerning minority rights in Europe. The two concepts of identity and citizenship are essentially different: while identity may concern ethnicity, language or religion, citizenship presupposes a certain common destiny shared by all citizens, participation in the political life at both local and national levels, as well as provides equal status and equal opportunities for all citizens.

Speaking of the state building, identity and citizenship may overlap significantly, forming the so-called ethnic state, which has been frequently the case in Eastern Europe. Where ethnic identity and citizenship do not overlap, one can speak of the civic nation state such as the case in many of the “old” European democracies (e.g. France). Citizenship implies a common public space, yet one can see that often in ethnic and even in civic nation states, minorities are excluded from it. Thus, Bruno Cautrès considered that the French Republican model might be “*intellectually attractive, yet in reality the French society is facing inequality*”. For instance, some mentioned that until very recently there were no TV presenters of colour on any of the large French TV channels, as for instance in the UK. Similarly, women are significantly underrepresented in positions of power in the French society. Therefore, according to Bruno Cautrès, despite the fact that principles of the French Republic do not favour positive discrimination, it may be a necessary measure in order to include minorities into the economic and political life of the country.

As for the legal basis of minority rights in Europe, it was underlined that while human rights and fundamental freedoms are individual rights and freedoms, some rights and freedoms require the existence of a community with a common language, culture, religion and traditions in order to be exercised. The Council of Europe conventions, norms, standards seek to protect the existence or survival of communities *in order to* ensure the exercise of individual rights and freedoms. Among the Council of Europe standards and norms, the main ones include the European Convention of Human Rights together with Protocol 12 providing general prohibition of discrimination, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), the European Convention for Regional and Minority Languages and the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which also promotes the participation of minorities in the public life.

A recent report on the FCNM, PACE⁴³ looks for “*balancing the rights of minorities with their obligations and with the protection of the cultural diversity, the consolidation of intercultural solidarity, social cohesion and the civil nation’s unity*”. Despite the complex and questionably confusing system of legal protection of minorities, multiple questions still remain: Is there a balance between difference and equality? How to avoid the dangers of segregation and separatism? Does Protocol 12 provide sufficient protection for various minorities? What about ethnic peoples without historically recognised minority status or recent immigration populations? There is a growing awareness of the need for the common public space and a greater two-way integration of minorities, in addition to simply the protection of minority rights. On the other hand, one may fear that the importance assigned to the protection of ethnic minorities may foster separatism and the formation of microstates, especially on the post-Soviet space.

Rights are not charity, and one should not speak of “giving” the rights to minorities but rather of admitting that these rights were denied and stopping to deny them. Furthermore, when giving the rights to somebody, one invariably excludes somebody else. Thus, speaking of the European citizenship, one cannot but remember those immigration populations in many of the old and new EU

41. Council of Europe, Directorate General of Political Affairs

42. Senior Lecturer, Institute of Political Studies, Paris

43. PACE Rec 1735 (2006)

member states who are excluded from the common space of the European citizenship. Different conceptions of nationality – civic or ethnic – result in different access to the EU citizenship. At present, the idea that the European identity may be helpful in overcoming divergences on the national level in many EU countries seems premature. The European identity completes but not substitutes the national identity; it has historically been more of economic than political nature. In addition, according to all indicators such as European elections turnout, the European *demos* is far from being a reality. Even though, according to Bruno Cautrès, the European integration has become less of an elite project since 1992, there is an increasing number of socio-political cleavages on what is Europe, which complicates the EU progress towards a more political union.

For Georgia, the European identity discourse is linked with that on the preservation of national territorial integrity and identity: first and foremost the workshop participants thought of themselves as Georgian and only then as European, as was made clear in the presentation by Irakli Alasania⁴⁴. According to him, Georgians have always wanted to be European, despite seventy years of the Soviet occupation, and the integration of Georgia into the EU is seen as a guarantor of Georgia's stability, territorial integrity and democratic development. Irakli Alasania has stressed the importance of clarity in the EU position towards Georgia, saying that without the European support and the promise of the future membership it would be much more difficult for Georgia to foster its democratic development as well as to manage the conflict with Abkhazia. During the discussion, one participant referred to the contradiction between the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination in international law⁴⁵; thus, for instance while in case of Kosovo the international community appears to favour the principle of self-determination, in other cases one follows the principle of territorial integrity. Another participant replied saying that in Europe, for the most part, the principle of territorial integrity is primary, on the assumption of the state is democratic and that it has not committed crimes against its minorities violating basic human rights. It was added that indeed in other contexts, *realpolitik* might be the driving force behind the events, such as in the cases of Chechnya and Transnistria.

The possible independence of Kosovo has been debated at length during the workshop, as there are fears about it becoming a precedent in the international law – a precedent that arguably may be used to legitimise the Abkhaz claim to sovereignty. Indeed, taking into consideration that the pre-war population in Kosovo was over 90% Albanian, while the pre-war Abkhaz population in Abkhazia was three times smaller than its Georgian population, one can hardly state the similarity of the two conflicts. Many of the participants believe that Kosovo and Abkhazia are essentially different cases, and that by “*making these comparisons one is proposing wrong solutions to the Abkhazian case dragging out the negotiations*”. It was told that Georgia should learn from the mistakes of the Serbian Government and should think of Abkhazia not simply as a part of their territory but as a place where other people live; Georgia has to think about “*what has Georgia to offer the Abkhaz people*”. According to some participants, Georgia would be better off not as an ethnic nation state, but rather as a civic nation where minorities are not excluded from the common public space. Irakli Alasania expressed his conviction that the conflict should be resolved peacefully even though Georgia possesses sufficient military strength. Referring to the tragic events of 1992-1993, when the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia took place, he disapproved of the idea of referenda in Abkhazia – not until the ethnic picture in the region is restored. People-to-people relations as well as strengthening of the economic ties between Georgia and Abkhazia may be the sole way out of this deadlock, indeed with international and European support. One could add that Sukhumi's perspective of the conflict would have been undoubtedly a different one, were any of the Abkhaz representatives present at the University for Democracy.

44. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Georgia to the UN; Special Representative of the President of Georgia for Abkhazia

45. These principles are stated in the document called Helsinki Final Act (1975) - territorial integrity (Article 4) and self-determination (Article 5).

b. Which European model(s) of social and economic integration?

The Academy for Political Development from Zagreb and the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence have opted to discuss various models of European social and economic integration at their respective workshops⁴⁶ on July 13. At the Zagreb workshop, discussion took off immediately into a lively debate on the nature of possible balance between on the one hand, economic development of the state in the context of globalisation and on the other hand, the preservation of the welfare state. Some participants supported the model of the welfare state for their own country since the heritage of the former regime, where most of the public services were accessible to all people, would serve as a hindrance to the introduction of the new liberalising reforms. Federico Oliveri⁴⁷, the moderator of the Zagreb workshop, expressed his strong support for the European model of integration based on values of social cohesion, different from the market-oriented model of the US. Pointing to the problem of poverty and inequality of the US, one of the largest in the developed countries, he called for a greater balance between economic growth and social cohesion which can be achieved with strong political will. Federico Oliveri made everybody re-think such seemingly easy questions as: What is economic growth and GDP? What does it mean for a regular citizen? How is economic growth shared? Who takes the decisions about the distribution of wealth?

Other participants also showed their support for the social model, yet they also saw the restraints imposed by the globalisation on the national economy and by the prioritisation of the economic growth and economic competitiveness, as it is indicated in the Lisbon strategy. According to a participant of the Zagreb workshop, Croatia as many other European countries will face difficulties in the next few years due to its aging population, which will surely strain the state retirement and insurance systems. The aid at the European level is available for instance through the European Social Fund and the Regional Policy, but as some of the participants mentioned, these mechanisms are too many and too complex to use. Thus, a question arises: How much should one pay in economic terms for social cohesion? It is impossible to provide free public services and at the same time keep the tax level low and businessmen happy. At the same time, taxes are necessary, since they constitute the basic instrument for the government to promote its policies and they represent the required membership fee in the “club of the citizens” of each and every state. Different tax systems reflect different value systems and in ideal are coherent with the real needs of a certain society at a certain point in history.

However, some participants appeared rather sceptical of the European social model, preferring the Anglo-Saxon market oriented model instead since “*Andy Smith’s invisible hand appears more efficient than the visible caring hand of the government*”. All too often, the government’s caring hand becomes too heavy and too inefficient. The invisible hand of the market, on the opposite, has neither mind, nor values – just calculations – and thus, according to some, may be the best way out, especially for a country with weak political forces, unable to guide the society. Only a few participants however advocated the free market along with the most important factors of economic integration – labour and capital mobility – considering government intervention utterly inefficient in terms of both costs and efforts. In the context of globalisation, the “copy-pasting” of the Scandinavian or the German model to Croatia may prove a difficult task due to the strain it may cause for Croatia – a country in transition that needs to concentrate on building a competitive economy. What seems to be a possible way-out is the enhanced dialogue between the state and the business sector, as well as between the business sector and the consumer. According to Federico Oliveri, there should be more accountability as to how the public money is spent. Further, consumers should be more responsible and not follow the price as their only guideline, but also the information that should be provided by enterprises. Thus, Federico Oliveri believes that active citizenship and information are the keys to success of the future European model, which would be based on “*the right balance between the forces of the market and the need for social cohesion*”.

46. To be further referred to as the Zagreb and Belgrade workshops

47. Council of Europe, Directorate General of Social Cohesion

Michel Dévoluy⁴⁸, the moderator of the Belgrade workshop, however, pointed to the current competition between, on the one hand, the development of the common European social model and identity and, on the other hand, the preservation of various national models, which form important parts of our history. Despite the attempts to transform Europe from an economic into a political union, the EU still has States as primary actors utterly in charge of the redistribution mechanisms. As a result of this gap between the economic and political dimensions, Europe is stuck with the complexity of its economic policies and without a clear social model. Michel Dévoluy expressed his fears that the EU enlargement may have rendered fragile the European model, that its founding father had wished to construct, since currently the levels of development are too different across the EU. According to him, real competition demands common rules and even level of competence across the EU. Current differentiation in the EU member states hinders the process of further harmonisation (e.g. of the rules on social protection). The negative results of the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands have demonstrated the lack of genuine debate on the problems facing the enlarged Union. Since all different parts of Europe do not currently follow the same dynamics, Michel Dévoluy proposed to create a multi-speed Europe, where some states would form “a deeper” Union sooner than others – what he calls “two-speed federalism”.

The participants of the Belgrade workshop were mostly concerned about the future of the EU enlargement and the different models the enlarged EU may take, rather than the nature of social and economic integration of the EU discussed by the participants of the Zagreb workshop. The enlargement fatigue of the many EU countries was strongly criticised, where many participants underlined the importance of the EU accession for conducting reforms in Serbia: *“The reforms in Serbia, but also in other countries in the Western Balkan region, are linked with possible European perspective. The reforms and political will them are largely based on the expectation of the eventual EU accession, and the goal is to make it happen as soon as possible. We aware of all problems within Europe but there is a question which would be an alternative and whether there is one?”* One participant asked, *“What will happen, if hypothetically, we are going to work for the next ten or twelve years on harmonising our domestic and foreign politics with European norms, and then the EU will end up not ready to absorb us and the citizens of the EU will not accept us as members of the Union?”* Another participant argued that the countries in the Balkans have to become the members of the EU for the reasons of security and stability: *“Europe must provide stronger guarantees for the countries of the Western Balkans in order to successfully finish political peace project which has been the main idea for the creation of a united Europe. I am afraid that based on our political experiences, it will not be possible to achieve stability in the Western Balkans region without a true perspective of the EU membership for all countries in the region”*. Yet, there are fears that even if the Western Balkan states become the members of the EU, they will be treated second or even third rank Member States, differently from the older Member States.

Both representatives of the Zagreb and Belgrade Schools have underlined the importance of political leadership in achieving stronger political integration of the EU as well as its further enlargement. One participant asked, *“The current dilemma is whether there is leadership in Europe which will carry out this type of integration. Are there any leaders in Europe who are ready to lose elections to make next step towards Europe’s integration? Do voters have the will to make such a step and do voters and politicians see Europe only as a mutual market or just a group of countries which will mutually develop solidarity and enable closer connections?”* Similarly, stronger leadership is needed in other carry out further EU enlargement. It has been pointed out that leaders in Serbia or Croatia are also facing a difficult task since they have to *“think of the future generations and not just of future elections”* and to convince their citizens that *“sacrifice and investment in the future are necessary”*.

48. Professor of Economics, Robert Schuman University, Strasbourg

Klaus Schumann⁴⁹ basically agreed with the idea of a multi-speed Europe discussed by Michel Dévoluy; yet, he stressed that this idea should not be described in negative terms in order not to damage the European spirit of solidarity and inclusion. The European project of 1949 (Council of Europe) and of 1951 (ECSC/European Community) has completely changed its political and geographical dimensions since 1989/1990 (the end of the ideological division of the continent). This new Europe has a common “genetic code”⁵⁰ with principles and values in line with the Council of Europe mantra of 1949 (pluralist democracy, protection of human rights and Rule of Law). This overall European model also includes the principles of social cohesion and cultural diversity. In its enlargement and neighbourhood policies the EU has by all means to avoid to set-up new dividing lines throughout the continent. The development and enlargement of both the Council of Europe and the EU is the victory of the successful practise of regional multilateralism.

The EU, therefore, must consolidate this unique achievement by stronger co-ordination of foreign policy, despite “*the desire of certain European states to have privileged relations with Mr Putin or Mr Bush and their unwillingness to give carte blanche to Mr Solana*”. As a final goal Klaus Schumann pleads in favour of one common European project encompassing the geographical area of all Council of Europe countries (46 at present). This implies a long and difficult process of change - socio-economic and cultural, political and institutional, but also a change in mentality in both EU countries and the current non-members of the EU. Within such a common, i.e. inclusive, European project the various existing European institutions develop and enlarge in a complementary and closely co-ordinated way. There exists in Europe a huge reservoir of common rules and standard setting as well as longstanding co-operation practises on all levels. The national and European decision-makers have to use those existing comparative advantages of co-operation and integration structures at best to achieve the ultimate goal of a common Europe of peace, liberty, solidarity and social justice.

49. former Director General of Political Affairs of the Council of Europe

50. Reference to the speech of François Heisbourg in the plenary session

2. European security and defence

a. Political frameworks for European security and defence

The workshop of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, held on July 13, 2006, was opened with the comprehensive presentation by Hans-Peter Furrer⁵¹ about the challenges and recent developments in the field of European security and defence. Ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, security has become the most important concern in Europe and worldwide. Formerly, explained Hans-Peter Furrer, the main concern for Europe and in particular for the Council of Europe had been democratisation and providing “*a basis for living together in Europe in accordance with the basic rules of behaviour – democracy and human rights*”. Along with OSCE, the Council of Europe then began to focus more on security matters and developed the concept of democratic security of the Council of Europe. Among the possible risks of such over-securitisation, he mentioned the prioritisation of NATO membership over the EU membership in certain parts of Europe, which contributes to the creation of dividing lines on the continent.

Similarly to such scholars of security studies as Barry Buzan⁵², Hans-Peter Furrer commented on the widening and deepening of the scope of security issues from military to political, societal, economic, and ecological aspects. The objects of securitisation differ; they include individuals, groups (minorities, migrants and refugees), culture and society; environment; economy; energy; as well as the territory, independence or population of the state. In addition to the traditional aspects of security, Europe is currently confronted with the challenges of a very diverse nature: ethnic conflicts, terrorism, trans-national crime, mafia, corruption, migratory pressures, national and technological disasters, economic blackmailing (e.g. energy security) and cyber attacks. The state, however, remains the main “provider of security”; if not, the “failed state” may become a threat to its neighbours and the whole international community.

Referring to Max Weber’s famous definition, Hans-Peter Furrer posed a question: how can the state preserve its monopoly for the legitimate use of force in the world where other actors of security sector are gaining in importance? Indeed, alliances for collective defence and collective security are indispensable for the preservation of security around the world. While *collective defence alliance* (e.g. NATO) is directed against the outside enemy, *collective security alliance* is bound to act against one of its members in case of aggression. The range of actors belonging to the security sector contains the following: armed forces and institutions (police, border and customs guards, intelligence services); non-statutory groups (private military groups and security companies, liberation guerrilla armies, organised crime, mafia, or terrorist movements); civil management (government, Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of the Interior); legal framework of the security sector (judiciary, the Constitution, law enforcement agency, human rights commissions, etc); and civil society (media, NGOs, think-tanks and research institutions). The interrelation between these different actors of the security sector represents the major problem for the European and the world community. It was emphasised that there is a need for better governance and a more democratic control in the security sector expressed in more transparent, accountable and participatory institutions, which are responsive to the needs of the people. A greater involvement of the civil society and media is therefore much encouraged. There should be an oversight over the security sector, setting the limits to the activities and to the budget of the intelligence services and setting the license requirements for the private security companies.

Further, there should be a better balance between the emphasis on hard and soft security instruments. Problems vary by country/region from over-consumption of resources in the military or in the police, as is often the case in the post-authoritarian countries, to under-investment in the security sector in the majority of under-developed countries. Hans-Peter Furrer believes that in the US, there is an obvious over-emphasis on the hard security instruments: “*If somebody has a*

51. Former Director General of Political Affairs of the Council of Europe

52. See for instance, Buzan, B. 1992. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

hammer, he would tend to consider every problem as a nail". Europe, on the contrary, allots too much emphasis on the soft security instruments while it does not dispose of sufficient statutory forces, which are too few and insufficiently co-ordinated. Hans-Peter Furrer called for a more unilateral European Common Foreign and Security Policy and for the implementation of the standards elaborated by both OSCE and the Council of Europe for the political frameworks of security and defence. Some Serbian participants pointed to the possible security risks of halting the process of the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, where the issue of Kosovo's independence was deemed to present the threat to the whole region. In general, Serbia's accession to NATO was seen as more probable than its membership in the EU, and some participants discussed the possible implications of the NATO membership on regional security in the Western Balkan region as well as the nature of the Euro-Atlantic relations.

The discussion that followed demonstrated that security is closely linked with social, political and economic issues. Some participants asked about the future EU borders once Bulgaria and Romania become members. Indeed, Bulgaria and Romania would have to comply with the Schengen requirements and strengthen the Eastern border. Yet, one cannot treat this issue only from the point of view of security. Other participants touched upon the issue of energy security and the risks of Europe's energy dependence on Russia. According to Hans-Peter Furrer, possible responses for the EU in the matter of energy security include the diversification of the transport lines of petrol from Eastern and Central-Asian area as well as the promotion of alternative energy sources, which is necessary in the long-term perspective. Yet, what is also important is tackling this problem at the political level engaging in constructive political dialogue with Russia: *"Rather than say that these questions will have political repercussions on the political relations inside Europe and with the Eastern neighbours, one needs to use political relations now to solve these problems"*.

There are different political frameworks for security and defence existing in Europe: the Council of Europe, NATO and OSCE. While they should all be based on common values of human rights, rule of law and democracy, there are differences between the American and European approaches to collective security. As Hans-Peter Furrer explained, in contrast to the Council of Europe, NATO does not stress the protection of human rights as much concentrating *"only on individual liberty as if it is a sufficient guarantee of good behaviour of people among themselves"*. Such "value dilemma" explains why Europeans find it hard to accept "the global war on terrorism", which sometimes involves the violation of human rights. It was said that the US often follows unilateral policies, which none of the EU countries can do: *"The US behaves as if they do not need co-operation with the others since indeed they have the tools. The concern we have in Europe for human rights and the rule of law comes from co-operation. That is the difference"*. The EU can be seen as an alliance of collective security since it has developed in the direction of deep integration in the political, economic and social fields, which makes the conflict among the EU member states virtually impossible. NATO is rather based on the assumption, which is not always justified, that its members would never venture a conflict among themselves. Yet, despite the differences, NATO and the EU cannot be seen as *alternative* but rather as *complementary* mechanisms in security matters, where European countries use NATO assets for their own operations and where the development of the EU armed forces goes on in close co-operation with NATO.

b. Energy security: between competition and co-operation

The Tbilisi School of Political Studies and the Academy for Political Development from Zagreb discussed the issues of energy security on July 13. According to the International Energy agency (IEA), world energy consumption would rise by 60 per cent by the year 2030, where emerging and developing nations such as India and China, would account for 2/3 of this rise. Already now the tension between the demand and supply of oil and natural is rising resulting in the explosion of energy prices. The increase in the energy prices is an important obstacle to the attainment of the Lisbon objectives, as higher electricity costs would damage the competitiveness of certain electricity-intensive industries. Besides, since the demand for energy is growing while the oil production

in the OECD countries is stagnating, there is a risk of increasing dependence on the outside sources of oil and natural gas. Thus, currently the EU imports 50 per cent of its fossil fuel sources from the countries such as Russia, Norway and Algeria; by 2030 – the import is estimated to account for 70 per cent. Furthermore, the increase in the consumption of the fossil fuel sources (oil, gas and coal) results in the increase of greenhouse gas emissions and in the gradual climate change.

Having outlined these alarming prospects, Jean Lamy⁵³, the moderator of the Zagreb workshop, listed a number of the internal and external policy mechanisms of the EU to secure energy supply for Europe⁵⁴. The common energy policy for Europe means liberalising electricity and gas markets by July 2007, where each individual consumer in Europe can choose its provider. The European Commission believes that well-functioning markets are the best way to ensure safe and affordable energy supplies for Europe. The European energy market is also to be opened to the EU neighbours within a common framework of trade, transit and environmental rules. The European Commission aims to “convince non-EU consumer countries that world energy markets can work for them” and to establish the open market of energy based on non-discrimination, competition, transparency and enforcement⁵⁵. Obviously, the European Commission would also have to persuade the Member States, and in particular the larger Member States, to follow the common European energy policy. As Philippe Sébille-Lopez⁵⁶ pointed out, it is the larger EU Member States who are often less supportive of the common energy policy since their energy dependence on outside sources is larger than that of the smaller Member States. While the European Commission recognises the right of individual Member States to “pursue their own external relations for ensuring security of energy supplies”, it believes that bilateral deals are not sufficient guarantors of energy security and strongly supports the development of “a coherent and focused external EU energy policy”⁵⁷.

Another important point in the European energy strategy is the strong emphasis on diversification of both geographical origins of energy sources as well as transit routes. Since Russia remains an important provider of energy in Europe, as both moderators of the Tbilisi workshop, Cyrille Gloaguen⁵⁸ and Philippe Sébille-Lopez emphasised, it is important for the EU and the EU neighbours, to develop a constructive dialogue and co-operation with Russia and to “organise interdependence” between the EU and Russia. While Russia has resources, Europe has technology and the capacity of investment, which is much needed both in the energy production, exploration and transportation. There is thus a need for “secure and predictable investment conditions for both EU and Russian companies and reciprocity in terms of access to markets and infrastructure as well as non-discriminatory third party access to pipelines in Russia”⁵⁹. The negotiations of the Energy Charter Transit Protocol and Russia’s ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty are to set the tone in the EU-Russia energy dialogue. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that runs through the Georgian territory was much discussed at the Tbilisi workshop, since it contributes to the diversification of energy sources in Europe and hinders the “russification” of the energy corridors. Russia’s monopolisation of energy corridors and Russia’s use of this monopoly as a political lever in its relations with its neighbours such as Ukraine and Georgia was considered as a major threat to democracy by many Georgian participants.

Along with providing stable sources of energy, Europe also needs to improve energy efficiency, which depends on the introduction of new technologies and the changes in individual behaviour and attitudes. The French Government proposed a number of measures to improve energy efficiency

53. Head of Office of International strategy, Directorate General of Energy and Raw Material, Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry, Paris

54. Jean Lamy referred to the following documents: An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy Interests, Paper from Commission/SG/HR for the European Council ; The Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (23/24 March 2006); The Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (15/16 June 2006); and French Memorandum for Revitalising European Energy Policy with A View to Sustainable Development (24/01/06)

55. An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy Interests, Paper from Commission/SG/HR for the European Council

56. Researcher, French Institute of Geopolitics, University of Paris VIII

57. An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy Interests, Paper from Commission/SG/HR for the European Council

58. Researcher, French Institute of Geopolitics, University of Paris VIII

59. The Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (23/24 March 2006)

in the residential and service sector, in the sectors of transport, as well as industry and agriculture. The EU needs to encourage research to develop “clean technologies” when using fossil fuels, to develop close partnership with the non-EU leading producing countries as well as to foster the usage of renewable energies. Furthermore, since emerging and developing countries are increasing their energy consumption, it is important to support the “*deployment of the ‘clean development mechanism’ (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, which offers a unique market-based opportunity to encourage investment in low-emission or more efficient technologies in these countries*”⁶⁰. Here, the technological know-how of the European countries as well as the EU policies of technical assistance are of great importance in the introduction of cleaner and newer technologies in the developing countries. The whole world community must take responsibility in the reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions, not just Europe. Therefore, it is highly important that the biggest energy consumers in the world such as China and the US also ratify the Kyoto Protocol.

During the discussion at the Tbilisi workshop, certain participants have pointed to the double standards for democracy when energy relations of France or Germany with Russia are concerned. The question of “fearing Russia” by both the EU countries and the former Soviet countries was much debated. It was underlined that it is not the fear stemming from dependence on Russia’s oil and gas that drives Europe but the desire for co-operation stemming from mutual interests. Energy co-operation with Russia is essential for Europe and should be developed further. At the same time, other transport routes and other energy sources should be established in order to diversify energy supplies and ensure their stability. For Georgia, especially, the need to diversify its energy supplies is directly linked with being politically and economically independent. Yet, currently, 15% of oil import in Georgia comes from Russia and 20% of Georgia’s trade is with Russia. Thus, in order to achieve its political goal of Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgia first needs to re-orient its economy. Some participants have underlined that Georgia should attempt to establish co-operative rather than conflicting relations with its neighbours and that the Trans-Caucasus can potentially become the bridge between Europe and Asia.

60. French Memorandum for Revitalising European Energy Policy with A View to Sustainable Development (24/01/06).

V. Directing action by the authorities: good governance

“The point of democracy is not to make everybody agree; the point of democracy is not to put an end to fighting, anger and argument; the point of democracy is to allow people to resolve differences in a peaceful way; and the ability to lose an argument gracefully is one of the most important aspects of a democratic mindset”

Kim Campbell⁶¹

The word ‘governance’ originates from the Latin verb *gubernāre* that means, “to steer a ship”. Traditionally, the central level used to be the only “captain” steering the country; nowadays, multiple actors at local, regional and supranational levels are becoming increasingly important. Antoine Durrleman⁶² opened the third plenary session of the Summer University for Democracy by outlining considerable changes in the mode of governance and public action. Thus, a politician has become just another actor in decision-making among many others. The vertical, or hierarchical, mode of government has given way to more network-based mechanisms of governance with new modes of legitimisation of power. Political decisions in their turn are being taken within the networks of complexity and incertitude, based not only on participation and negotiations, but also on reaching a wider consensus within the society. Democracy is therefore transforming from representative to participatory, where civil society, technocracy and other non-governmental groups may take a greater part in decision-making. However, according to Antoine Durrleman, the search for consensus may also have a negative side: *“There is a risk that consensus becomes simply a balance of interests and not anymore the orientations, which permit to advance and have a genuine strategic vision”*. In addition to its possible lack of vision, the inefficiency of the new mode of governance may become another important obstacle to its realisation.

Indeed, as the majority of participants of the panel have noted, the new mode of governance is not yet in its final form; rather, it constantly continues to develop and progress. Kim Campbell stressed that never can there be found an ideal country or a political system *“where talented governors can come and apply all the theories of good governance”*; rather, the young politicians should understand that democratic governance and democracy are human creations and thus are never perfect. Most of the world’s countries are facing the problems of linguistic fragmentation, ethnic diversity and historical animosity, and even culturally homogenous societies face the problem of the divergence of interests. Democracy is there to become a tool to resolve these differences in a peaceful way and to give a voice to the weak. At the EU level, good governance often means multi-level governance, which recognises the importance of the local and supranational levels of governance, in addition to the state level. Jean-Dominique Giuliani⁶³ outlined the principles of good governance: accountability of the public administration, transparency of decision-making and the existence of control by the Parliament and civil society, effectiveness and efficiency of institutions and public authorities, their responsiveness to the needs of the society, and their capacity to foresee problems and to apply the law on the basis of equality and transparency.

The European Commission, in its White Book on Good Governance (2001), also underlines the importance of participation, coherence, subsidiarity and proportionality. In addition to the Copenhagen criteria (institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with

61. Former Prime Minister of Canada

62. Director of National School of Administration (ENA), France

63. President of the Robert Schuman Foundation, Paris

competitive pressures and market forces within the EU, and the ability to take on the obligations related to the membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union), the principles of good governance have become requirements of the European Commission for the EU candidate states and Jean-Dominique Giuliani explains why:

The ameliorations in the domain of good governance are directly linked to security and stability. Their objectives include the anchorage of political structures and the establishment of legitimate democratic political institutions as well as the promotion of the State of Law, the renouncement of violence and human rights. The economic aspects of good governance possess a particular importance in the European context, meaning the existence of well-defined legal instruments in order to allow for the development of private economy and the fight against corruption. The development of civil society and the relations between the State and the citizens deserve a particular attention.

The EU is often criticised for its ‘democratic deficit’, and according to many, the French and Dutch referenda demonstrated the dissatisfaction of the people with the functioning of the EU institutions. There is a need for the EU to improve the sources of information on the questions that are treated by the EU, to improve the transparency of its institutions and the Council of Ministers in particular, and to lessen the distance between the citizens and their EU representatives. Jean-Dominique Giuliani believes that European governance would benefit from assigning a greater role to national parliaments and to the European Parliament, by for instance equipping them with the right to initiate legislation at the EU level, which is currently the exclusive prerogative of the European Commission.

Another major theme of the discussion concerned decentralisation and local democracy. As Kim Campbell noted, *“good governance is a way of assigning competences to make sure that people are never too far away from those who are making decisions on their behalf”*. Such governance allows politicians to consult and interact with people, which in the end may prevent politicians from making important mistakes. At the European level, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe actively promotes the decentralisation of power from national level towards territorial communities, the transfer of competences to regional and local level – the level closest to the citizen where good governance can be best delivered. The decentralisation of power is resonant with the principle of subsidiarity, which has been enshrined in the European Charter of Local Self-Government and included in the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union. According to Giovanni Di Stasi⁶⁴, *“empowering territorial communities will not only lead to greater cohesion and better governance at inter-territorial level across our continent, but will also give the sense of belonging to our citizens, the sense of being involved in decision-making – ultimately, inspire their more active participation in democratic processes and the European integration as a whole”*.

It is at the local level that the authorities can be most creative when resolving ethnic tensions and fostering the inter-cultural dialogue, or involving both citizens and foreign residents into the life of the community. Furthermore, ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall, national borders have diminished in importance allowing local and regional authorities to establish cross-border co-operation. What Giovanni Di Stasi calls a *“power shift between the national and local level”* is reflected in the increasing self-sufficiency of local economy as well as increasing inter-territorial co-operation. Cross-border co-operation is necessary in order to even out the differences in socio-economic development among various regions in the EU and beyond, as well as to reinforce local democracy. The Congress for instance has created the Network of Associations of Local Authorities in South-East Europe, NALAS, which brings together local authorities representing some 60 million people in the region. When it comes to inter-regional co-operation the Congress assists in the creation of the so-called *“new generation Euro-regions”* bringing together national, regional and local authorities from both EU and non-EU countries. In 2006, the Adriatic Euro-region was launched and

64. Past-President of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Council of Europe

will be followed by the Black Sea Euro-region. Such inter-territorial and inter-regional networks are believed to contribute to the exchange of innovative approaches, know-how and best practices between various levels of governance, and in that sense are directed at implementing the Lisbon strategy of the EU and extending it beyond the EU borders. All of these innovations, however, are to pursue the same unchanging goal – advancing democracy. *“This process”, according to Giovanni Di Stasi, “begins at the grassroots level. It is in the Agora Square in Athens where participatory democracy was born – the fact which proves that local democracy is the pillar of a democratic society, and if local democracy dies, there will be no democracy at all”.*

While decentralisation is the key to participatory democracy, in transition countries, there is a risk that premature decentralisation may cause disorder and subsequent return to a more rigid system, as Nicolae Chirtoaca⁶⁵ mentioned during the discussion. Similarly, a representative of the Moscow School of Political Studies, Aleksey Koz’ymin⁶⁶ pointed out that when political conflicts among different political powers hinder governance – as is often the case in transition countries – there is a temptation to opt for a more traditional vertical system of power, which can be justified as more efficient. Thus, finding the right balance between participatory democracy and efficiency comes as a major problem of governance. There are many factors contributing to the establishment of good democratic governance. Economic growth is indeed one of them, as another participant from the audience, Suren Movsisyan⁶⁷ rightly pointed out. Kim Campbell agreed that while economic growth does not necessarily result in democratic governance and in the elimination of corruption, it certainly helps to *“provide adequate remuneration to the judiciary or the police force”* and to establish strong democratic institutions.

Governance has become a new paradigm of public action, although it still continues to develop and progress. Yet, governance, as Antoine Durrleman noted, should be seen less a tool but more as the will to co-operate among multiple actors. Robert Hertzog⁶⁸ stressed that improved co-operation among institutions and among individuals who comprise these institutions can be the only way towards a more governable Union. Currently, with the increasing role of multiple new actors at local and supra-national level, as well as with the dispersion of multiple objectives into different domains, everything is becoming interdependent. Yet, asks Robert Hertzog, *“Who and at what level has the capacity to synthesise and assure coherence?”* According to Otmar Philipp⁶⁹, the principle of subsidiarity does not necessarily provide decision-makers with clear legislation applicable in practice. Furthermore, the domain of the Public Law has been extended to public policies, where the Monetary Union has become a constitutional system that defines material rules in economic and monetary field (e.g. rules concerning price stability or the deficit limit). Today, the Public Law articulates economic doctrines that have passed from the domain of economic policies to juridical density (e.g. the Law on Competition). Political authority and administration respect at the same time economic and juridical principles, but it is not yet clear which ones they respect more.

Thus, although the new mode of governance may be better in terms of greater involvement of different actors in decision-making and thus being more democratic, it is confronted with the problems of efficiency and clarity. The dissatisfaction of the EU population with the way the EU functions may stem from the complexity of the system and heaviness of its bureaucratic structure. As Otmar Philipp noted, the competences of the EU are determined by the Member States, and therefore, they are responsible for the all the deficiencies of the EU. At the same time, the EU is not just another international organisation since it possesses the so-called “double legitimacy”, where both the EU Member States and the EU citizens, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are co-legislators. According to several participants, the central problem of the EU governance

65. Director EISPM, political analyst, Chisinau

66. Deputy, Regional Parliament, Irkutsk region, Russia

67. Political Scientist, Armenian-Russian Centre “ROSAR”, Yerevan

68. Professor of Public Law, Institute of Political Studies, Robert Schuman University, Strasbourg

69. Administrator, European Parliament

concerns the lack of democratic control. Assigning a greater role to the European Parliament, as Jean-Dominique Giuliani proposed, could bring European citizens closer to Europe since they would have more direct impact on and more responsibility for the decisions taken the EU level.

The Conference “Directing action by the authorities: good governance” was followed by two series of workshops. The first one series “Responsible leadership at local and regional level: the political challenge of local self-government” discussed the issues of local governance and citizens’ participation as well as reinforcement of local and regional executives. The second series of workshops “Policies for public probity” discussed public administration reform and financing of political parties.

1. Responsible leadership at local and regional level: the political challenge of local self-government

a. Local governance and citizens' participation

“Governance” has become a popular concept meaning that traditional public actors such as the state authorities and administration are not the only ones to respond to economic and social needs of the society whether at national, regional or local level. Ideally, governance foresees citizens' participation, where in addition to the public authorities, non-governmental organisations, various citizens' associations, enterprises and chambers of commerce are involved in the public action and joint decision-making. Governance is based on networking and public-private partnerships between the public authorities and these numerous actors. The concept of governance is seen as a new mechanism to cure the malfunctioning of the traditional representative democracy, where the decreasing voting turnout undermines the legitimacy of those in power. People's low electoral participation demonstrates both distrust in the democratic institutions and the prevailing feeling of the insignificance of one's vote. Therefore, other forms of participation are necessary in order to increase the legitimacy and the efficiency of the public authorities, as well as to create a sense of inclusion and solidarity among the population in Europe's increasingly individualist societies.

The Skopje School of Politics and the Moscow School of Political Studies discussed the issues of local governance and citizens' participation in their respective workshops on July 13. The moderators of both workshops, Valerie Lozac'h⁷⁰ and Jean-Marie Woehrling⁷¹ have launched the discussion by deconstructing the concept of governance and by explaining how it is different from the traditional notion of democracy. Valerie Lozac'h noted that one should have a very critical approach to governance since this concept is too vague and may take different forms in various fields – economy, sociology, and political science. Furthermore, the concept does not actually represent a new mode of public action – indeed, networking and public-private partnerships have existed in European countries on an *ad hoc* basis for a long time. Rather, one could perhaps speak of the institutionalisation of already existing practices, at least in certain countries (e.g., Germany or France).

Furthermore, while governance and private-public partnerships tend to be seen as “signs of better democracy”, Valerie Lozac'h appears sceptical about the apparent opening of the decision-making process to all public and private actors. What is happening is the partial or selective opening towards certain actors and social groups, which reminds more of a corporatist model rather than a democratic one, which in ideal should be open to all. While most of the scholars and politicians maintain a positive discourse on governance, inclusion and participation, Valerie Lozac'h invites everyone to reflect on the exclusion that accompanies these partnerships. Similarly, one should not overlook the power relations and the lobbying capacity of certain powerful private actors that often determine the nature of public-private partnerships. At the national level such participatory logic is difficult to implement due to a highly limited access to decision-making. Furthermore, the value of traditional representative democracy should not be neglected by prioritising the interests of a certain group as opposed to the rest of the country – any association can only represent itself and not the majority of the population. At the local level, participatory democracy is easier to achieve since the selection mechanisms are not as strong as at the national level. There can be different levels of citizens' participation starting with information sharing/communication (e.g. dissemination/distribution of written material and documents, through official gazettes, media, press conference; responding to questionnaires and surveys, providing various kind of data, opinion surveys) or consultation (e.g. town hall meetings, focus groups, conferences, hearings), and finishing with collaboration (e.g. public reviews of draft legislation, local government led working groups, planning session) and even joint decision making (e.g. joint committees, advisory committees, public-private partnerships).

70. Senior Lecturer in Political Science, Institute of Political Science, Strasbourg

71. Secretary General, Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine

Empirical studies have shown that currently, participatory democracy in Europe may involve communication and sometimes consultation; however, joint decision-making is practically non-existent. Thus, for instance French *conseils de quartier* (urban district councils) that reunite regularly to debate on local politics, are presided by the city mayor or the representatives of the local authorities, who normally determine the decision-making powers of the district councils. There is sometimes a certain resistance on the part of the local authorities towards such initiatives: indeed, according to the classical notion of democracy, a private citizen or an association cannot compete with the public authorities, who have both the electoral mandate and the expertise. Ideally these alternative forms of participation should target the least active and the least represented groups of the society such as the youth as well as foreign residents who do not have voting rights. However, as Valerie Lozac'h indicated, these forms of participation tend to reinforce the position of those already active and socially integrated rather than those "excluded from the classical political game". For instance, it is normally the more educated, already active and generally older people, who participate in the work of *conseils de quartier*, and this results in a certain social selection and the perpetuation of the existing cleavages. Citizens' participation at the local level is however necessary as it provides an opportunity of dialogue, thanks to which various social groups may make themselves heard and the work of public authorities may be rendered more efficient.

Local governance indeed depends on multiple conditions: territorial organisation of the state, the role of local authorities and the scope of their powers, their financial autonomy, as well as the relations between central and local authorities. To sum up, the development of local governance is directly linked to the level of decentralisation in a given country. At both workshops the issue of financial autonomy came up in the discussion as one of the major problems. In certain Central and Eastern European countries, States delegate some of their missions to the sub-national levels without providing them with the necessary means. As one of the participants of the Moscow workshop proposed, the division of competences and budget among the different levels of governance should be turned upside-down: "What a municipality can do, it should do; what it cannot do, should be the competence of the subject of the Federation". Similarly, with taxes: "the taxes collected in a certain territory and contributing to the investment attractiveness of that territory should stay there; other taxes may go to the State." Thus, the Russian participant actually proposed the subsidiarity principle, enshrined in the European Charter on Local Self-Governance, to be applied in Russia. However, many other participants of the Moscow workshop demonstrated that the decentralisation process in Russia is itself too centralised: local governance is thought to come into existence simply as a result of top-down legislation reforms.

The prevailing pessimism as for the development of local governance in Russia and the implementation of the European Charter on Local Self-Governance was explained by multiple reasons. Some participants referred to the lack of financial autonomy of the local level and the lack of tradition of using local financial sources as the main obstacles. Others believed that the problem is cultural: namely, both Orthodox Church, which does not promote individual responsibility, and the heavy communist heritage have resulted in the absence of social demand for citizens' participation in Russia. The apparent resistance of the local authorities across Russia towards citizens' involvement and their pursuit of personal interest rather than caring for public welfare also appear among the obstacles to good governance. In sum, it is 'local power' and 'local government', not 'local governance', that is still being established in Russia. The establishment of good governance in Russia may take time but is still possible, as several participants have underlined, with growing knowledge and experience that would surely lead to the change in practices and mentality.

b. Local governance and reinforcement of local and regional executives

The Kiev School of Political studies and the Priština Institute for Political Studies chose the reinforcement of local and regional executives and the establishment of local governance as their topics of discussion at their respective workshops held on July 13⁷². Both in Ukraine and in Kosovo the

72. To be further referred to as Kiev and Priština workshops

weakness of the local level of governance poses a serious problem, and the heated discussions held in both workshops demonstrated the importance and complexity of the issue. In order to set the limits to the discussion, the moderator of the Kiev workshop, Robert Hertzog⁷³ focused on the role of the mayor in local governance, and possible problems concerning his or her powers and responsibilities. Artemy Karpenko⁷⁴, the second moderator, spoke more broadly about improving the potential of the local self-governance, which is also one of the main objectives of the Council of Europe. He noted that local self-governance depends not only on the mayor but also on more systemic and institutional factors such as the level of decentralisation as well as the co-operation among various levels of governance.

What should be good governance at the local level? The Council of Europe and more precisely the Action Plan accepted at the Warsaw Summit of the Council of Europe, includes such instrument as *Benchmarks of An Effective Local Authority*, which proposes a methodology for improving the potential of local self-governance. It also outlines the main functions of local self-governance: the development of a strategic vision and planning in medium and long-term perspectives; providing public services (e.g. primary education and healthcare), as well as working and interacting with the population. Here, one could add creating favourable conditions for local economic development as well as environmental protection as other important functions of the local authorities. Besides, the European Charter of Local Self-Government offers a more complex framework for the countries undergoing the process of decentralisation. While decentralisation is a common trend in many European countries, the workshops have demonstrated that it may be a different process in different countries, depending on their historical tradition and political situation.

According to the majority of the participants of the Kiev workshop, the Ukrainian administrative system remains rather centralised, despite the fact that with the Budget Reform carried out in 2001, local governments were delegated with financial autonomy. The matching administrative competences, however, have not been transferred from the central to the local level, resulting in the situation where the central level dictates norms and regulations that may not correspond to the local reality. According to the European Charter of Local Self-Government, however, resources should be proportional to competences.

In Kosovo, as many of the participants of the Priština workshop demonstrated, decentralisation is a top-down process due to the political situation in the province. One is left to hope, as Owen Masters⁷⁵ said, that the interests of people of Kosovo would be taken into consideration by the international authorities. Decentralisation process in Kosovo is still at its early stage, and instead of speaking of decentralisation, as Jean-Paul Chauvet⁷⁶ proposed, one should perhaps rather speak of territorial re-organisation. The number and size of municipalities in Kosovo were much debated, where the minimum size of a municipality was deemed to be 5,000 people for it to be at the same time efficient and close to the people. As Owen Masters said, *“Municipalities should be small enough to be close to the people but they should be large enough to be able to devolve real power and real competences”*. The politicisation of the process of territorial re-organisation in Kosovo may lead to the establishment of “ethnic municipalities”, which were criticised by the majority of the workshop participants. Were this to happen, new mechanisms reinforcing the co-operation among various municipalities should be introduced. It was added that every community could benefit from learning the language of their neighbours so that there would better communication among the people from different ethnic groups.

At the Ukrainian workshop, the most heated discussion concerned the role of the mayor in local self-governance. There were some provocative statements made as for the “almighty” position of the mayor in Ukraine and the lack of mechanisms controlling his or her power. Thus, as one participant explained, the mayor is directly elected by the population, presides the local council meet-

73. Professor of Public Law, Strasbourg Institute of Political Studies

74. CE, Directorate General I – Legal Affairs

75. Former Member of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities

76. Council of Europe, Secretariat of the Congress

ings, is often the chair of the executive committee of the council and has strong decision-making powers over the local budget. Moreover, the participant insinuated that often the members of the local council are manipulated by the mayor and thus “*support his every wish*”. Although the mayor can be impeached by 2/3 of the local council members, there have been few cases of impeachments in 11,000 communes. In order to improve the situation, the participant called for the “*democratisation of the local self-governance*” and proposed to strengthen the role of the local council.

The abuse of power, sadly, is very common at all levels of governance in many countries. As Robert Hertzog noted, “*just because the government is local, does not mean that it is an ideal democratic government*”. The mayor should be held responsible before the council and the citizens, who should be able to complain in the court if they are not satisfied with the services provided by the local authorities. When people are inactive, it is the State that provides the mechanisms of control, which indeed is against the idea of local autonomy. Other participants, however, thought that on the contrary, the mayor in Ukraine is the “victim of the circumstances”: overburdened with the multiple responsibilities as well as with various regulations and norms coming from the state. Furthermore, as other participants have noted, the mayor does not have essential instruments of power such as local taxes or municipal police. The mayor’s veto on any of the council’s decisions, which can be considered as an important sign of power, may be overcome with the 2/3 of the council members. Another issue discussed at the Kiev workshop concerned the accumulation of mandates of the mayors, which is currently forbidden in Ukraine. Here again, opinions differed: while some believed that holding different mandates may be inefficient, others thought that it may in fact help to lobby local interests on regional or national levels of power. As Robert Hertzog noted, where local self-governance is weak, the accumulation of mandates may reinforce the local level; where the autonomy of the local level is stronger, demanding full-time work on the part of the mayor, the accumulation of mandates leads to poor results. Since the remuneration of mayors is often insufficient, the accumulation of mandates often serves as a way to accumulate salaries; in worse cases, low pay is a direct path towards corruption.

Financing came up as a major issue at both workshops. In Kosovo, it is early to speak of local taxes; most of the local budget still depends on donor financing, mainly from the European Commission. The problem of tax evasion seems large, and creating smaller municipalities would perhaps help to solve the problem since people could feel that they have more control and responsibility over their community. The EU funding is of extreme importance to the municipalities in Kosovo, as well as other EU countries. However, Owen Masters underlined the importance of direct linkage between the EU and sub-national level in Kosovo when it comes to the allocation of the funding. Thus, in his view, the money should go directly to a municipality, bypassing the state level management of the funds, as it is currently the case in many the EU countries. The participants of the Kiev workshop also demonstrated that the lack of local budget often hinders the provision of quality public services. Yet, it was underlined that the local level cannot and should not have health and education as their exclusive competences. Since the level of education and quality of healthcare should be more or less equal across the country, the state must be implied and must co-finance these services. At both workshops, the participants underlined the need to establish mechanisms of equalisation in order to have a more fair distribution of funding among different regions or municipalities.

Finally, the lack of expertise of the local level appears to present one of the major problems both for Kosovo and Ukraine. Here, the training of local authorities is needed, and it is where the Council of Europe may provide important help. Furthermore, as some participants at the Kiev workshop proposed, minimum educational or professional requirements should be imposed on candidates for the mayor’s position. Others, however, disagreed saying that the mayor should not necessarily be a specialist; rather, he must rely on the administration, which should be capable to provide the necessary expertise. One of the participants compared local governance with efficient business management: as in business, one needs talented managers to lead a community to success.

2. Policies for public probity

a. Public administration reform: between ethics and effectiveness

Effectiveness and ethics in public administration reform – do they contradict or complement each other? The discussions held at the workshops of the Moscow School of Political Studies and the Ukrainian School of Political Studies on July 13 have demonstrated that in a wider context of good governance, public administration should meet both ethical standards and the standards of efficiency. Many European countries are currently undergoing administrative reforms whether to stabilise public finance, or to respond to citizens' demand for efficiency, or to respond to globalisation and increasing convergence between administrative systems. The means to promote administrative efficiency and the role of ethics include: adopting New Public Management or some of its methods and implications; empowering staff, increasing their skills and their scope for independent or discretionary action – ethics serves as a counterweight to arbitrariness in the exercise of their prerogatives; developing accountability; developing assessment: standards of performance required of public employees on the basis of a value system; the importance of training public employees (qualification, in-service training); access to administration (decentralisation, subsidiarity); quality of regulations (clarity, precision, availability to the general public); simplifying administrative procedures; certainty of the law; altering the relationship between administration and politics; and combating corruption – ethics of the administration and its consequences in prescriptive terms.

Stephane Leyenberger⁷⁷ and Cyril Clement⁷⁸, the moderators of the Moscow workshop believe that such standards of efficiency are applicable both to public administration and to judicial system, where both are considered as public services and thus have to comply with certain standards of efficiency. Christophe Bonnote⁷⁹, the moderator of the Kiev workshop, drew attention of the participants to the New Public Management (NPM) model, which was first introduced in the UK in order to render public administration more dynamic and functional and which later spread to many other European countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy. Following a greater convergence between administrative systems in Europe, the NPM model will most likely spread to many other countries, where it could result in a unique mix with traditional systems of public administration. In general, NPM is closer to private business management as it places less emphasis on administrative and bureaucratic rules and procedures, while favouring profitability and satisfaction of citizens as consumers of public services. The NPM model involves a more employment-based civil service since it is more flexible than a career-based system. Being based on the notions of flexibility and subjected to competition, NPM has developed a genuine management culture, centred around five key words: *competition, contract, objective, assessment and performance*.

Yet, while such a model of public administration leads to the improvement of efficiency, Christophe Bonnote questions its compatibility with the notions of ethical behaviour and more precisely with the notions of *deontology*, or moral obligations that accompany a certain profession. Namely, NPM presupposes that values are well integrated in public agents and in the society as a whole through the long process of socialisation that starts already in the family and in the school. If the system of values is weak, then NPM may enhance the domination of the egoistic self-interest over the values that should constitute the basis of public service. Therefore, before speaking of administrative reform one should develop administrative culture and values. The change of administration should go on in a wider context of changes in the whole political system of a given country. Thus, during the period of transition, the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe adopted predominantly employment-based models for their new civil services, partly because of the aid and the influence of the US in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, as corruption soon increased, these

77. Council of Europe, Directorate General I – Legal Affairs

78. Senior Lecturer in Public Law, University of Paris VIII

79. Deputy Secretary General of EUROPA, Limoges

states opted for statutory models, which like the French or the German models, allow their civil servants to be given not only a regular professional career but also certain obligations.

Both Moscow and Kiev workshops demonstrated that the issues of ethics and efficiency of public administration in Russia and Ukraine are problematic due to the absence of administrative culture and values. While the French moderators of both workshops focused on explaining the ideals of efficient and ethical public administration, the Russian and Ukrainian participants continuously pinpointed the enormous bulk of problems of inefficiency and the lack of ethics of public administration in Russia and Ukraine. The general tone of discussion in both workshops tended to slide into pessimism and the criticism of corrupted judges, the lack of transparency and accountability of administration, as well as inactive citizens who do not carry out or do not dare to carry out much-needed public control over the State. One Russian participant noted, *“While in developed countries the State is seen as provider of services, in Russia, the State power is still seen as sacred, directed by some ambiguous national interest. We have a huge population but few citizens. In practice it is not the Law that guides the actions of public officials but a call from above”*. Another participant from the Kiev workshop said, *“The problem of ethics is not the most important when most of the administration staff changes with the coming of a new president”*. The institution of independent and politically neutral administration is still absent in both Russia and Ukraine.

In the case of post-Soviet countries it is perhaps early to speak of the introduction of NPM and one should rather concentrate on undertaking complex measures in order to both improve the administrative culture and introduce systemic institutional changes in the public administration. The dichotomy “system-person” became an interesting subject of discussion of the joint workshop with both Schools present. Some believed that one should first re-educate the population and wait until the current elites have been completely substituted by new ones, as it had happened for instance in the Baltic States. Others believed that in the current conditions in Russia and Ukraine, one should improve the system and minimise the “human factor” so that no matter what person, corrupted or not, becomes a civil servant, he or she would not be able to sway from the right course of action thanks to prompt institutional constraints.

In addition to the theoretical debate, the participants of both workshops offered several practical solutions. First, there should be more co-operation among various countries in the matters of setting certain standards and norms of efficiency of administration and judicial systems. The Moscow School discussed possible quantitative and qualitative indicators of the efficiency of the judicial system such as for instance the number of decisions per judge or the motives of judgements (the latter criterion would be indeed more difficult to assess). As one Russian participant noted, it is the end-users of public services, or in other words, the citizens, who can best evaluate the work of public administration, and thus citizens’ level of satisfaction should be the primary indicator. Second, there should be forums for dialogue between authorities and administration on the one hand, and civil society, on the other hand. Third, educational campaigns of the population are needed in order to improve participation and to help generate social demand for transparency and efficiency of democratic administration. Fourthly, administrative procedures, including recruitment procedures, should be simplified and made more transparent. All these solutions, however, will hardly lead to success if everyone would continue to blame the system, instead of concentrating on making a difference – each on their part, each in the limit of their capacity.

b. Financing of political parties

The Priština Institute for Political Studies and the Skopje School of Politics discussed the subject of financing of political parties on July 13. Financing of political parties, if not done in accordance with widely respected written and unwritten rules and principles, becomes a source of corruption and thus poses a serious threat to democracy. At the Priština workshop, Alexander Seger⁸⁰ demonstrated that in Europe, the main corruption problem appears to be political corruption, or *“the*

80. Department of Crime Problems, Directorate General of Legal Affairs, Council of Europe

violation of democratic principles through corrupt forms of lobbying, conflicts of interest, patronage and revolving doors, and the abuse of the justice system” and most importantly “corruption in relation to the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns”. Political parties are perceived as the most corrupt institutions⁸¹, and they are often accused for undermining the democratic principles of political equality and fair competition, accountability, transparency and rule of law. Thus, in many countries, parties may receive political contributions in exchange for favours, contracts or policy change; they also may be involved in illegal expenditure and vote buying, abuse state resources and extort private sector contributions.

It is not to say that politics and democracy do not cost; indeed, political players need money. However, the regulation system as well as political culture should assure that the playing field is even, providing all political actors with equal opportunities to succeed. Instead, often one can see how democracy becomes corporate and criminalised, where, as Tiziano Balmelli⁸² said, *“election campaigns dominated by purely commercial forms of propaganda stifle any genuine public debate on the problems confronting society and the solutions proposed by the political parties”.* Regulations at both national and European level are indispensable: while already some 80% of the 46 Council of Europe Member States have established systems to regulate political finances (e.g. regulations to disclose contributions and expenditure, or to publicise accounts), there has to be a set of common standards and rules against political corruption in order to achieve a greater unity among Members. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has adopted a Recommendation on Common Rules Against Corruption in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns, and GRECO – the “Group of States against Corruption” – has been authorised to monitor the implementation of these rules. These measures provide the Council of Europe Member States with minimal standards and rules as well as independent monitoring.

One should note, however, that regulations alone should not be seen as a panacea. In some Scandinavian countries (e.g. Norway or Iceland) there are practically no regulations and – paradoxically – no problems of political corruption. While in some countries corruption is the exception, in others – it is the norm. As was discussed in the Priština workshop, it is difficult to eradicate political corruption where it has been ‘institutionalised’: corruption should be reported through the media, and the laws and regulations ensuring impartiality and independent monitoring should be adopted. As Tiziano Balmelli added, the lack of effectiveness can often be explained by the fact that most of the time, those who decide on the laws and regulations for financing of political parties are the (self-interested) political parties themselves, through their representatives in the Parliament. An even higher risk concerns the monitoring of the implementation: the controlled ones should not be the same as the controllers. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, for instance, it is the Ministry of Finances that controls the application of regulations on financing of political parties, which raises questions about the impartiality of such control. Here, the international monitoring as well as the involvement of NGOs in the control mechanisms can be seen as a possible solution.

The two main points of the discussion in both workshops concerned the sources of financing of political parties and electoral expenditure. When it comes to financial sources, they can be public, private, or they can represent a mixed system of public subsidies and private funding, as it is now in the majority of European countries. As Yves-Marie Doublet⁸³ noted, some countries have banned the donations to political parties from legal persons; others introduced regulations on disclosure of sources, thus focusing on transparency of financing instead. Increasing public financing may not be a good solution, as Tiziano Balmelli argued, as it can often exacerbate the problem of corruption *“by injecting more money into the system and thus quite simply prompting a sharp increase in the price to be paid by interest groups and businesses to obtain favours from the parties and candidates”.* On the one hand, public financing may weaken the link between political

81 TI Global Corruption Barometer 2005

82 Lecturer, University of Fribourg

83 National Assembly, Paris

parties and the society, where political parties would start to dominate the society instead of representing it. In young democracies, on the other hand, public financing can help institutionalise political parties.

Another solution is setting the limit to electoral expenditure, especially since it is much easier to control how the money is spent than to trace from where the money comes. As Tiziano Balmelli said, *“Supervision of electoral expenditure is thus the prerequisite for any effective legislative action in this area: it can be regarded as a natural law of politics that the greater the electoral expenditure, the greater the risk of corruption. Greater transparency in the funding of political life can help to improve the general public’s image of political parties and their leaders, by reducing the feeling that the economy and politics intertwine in secret, in a manner which is absolutely contrary to the general interest”*. In Kosovo, as one participant of the Priština workshop said, *“the heads of political parties are the richest people in the country, even if their declarations of assets do not show anything; also the people closest to political parties are the richest people in the country”*. The Skopje team as well pointed to the high level of political corruption and weak anti-corruption regulations in their country. New democracies often face similar problems such as the lack of diversity of resources, which results in parties’ external dependency on large donors, and weak roots of parties in society, which of course means that parties cannot sufficiently benefit from membership subscriptions.

One needs legislation on the financing of electoral campaigns and political parties; yet, regulations and control mechanisms serve nothing if there are no sanctions that can be effectively implemented in the case of breaching the law. Thus, the UNMIK Regulation no. 2004/11 (May 5, 2004) on the Registration and Operation of Political Parties in Kosovo establishes rules on the finances of political parties, providing for contribution limits, excluding corporate contributions and requesting parties to submit bi-annual financial reports and to maintain records. Yet, one may have doubts as to the efficiency of this regulation. Some countries (e.g. France) have introduced electoral sanctions, where for instance a candidate may be announced ineligible for a certain period of time for over-spending on electoral campaign. There are also financial sanctions, where a political party may lose its public financing, as well as penal sanctions (e.g. in the UK and in Germany). To conclude, since democracy does need money to function, one should establish clear and realistic rules to regulate both the financial sources of political parties and their electoral expenditure. It is difficult to make political players comply with the rules on transparency, which would remain illusory unless they are coupled with an effective supervision of electoral expenditure. Furthermore, as the discussions in both Priština and Skopje workshops demonstrated, there is a need for independent monitoring and enforcement of regulations, where sanctions are of extreme importance. Finally, corruption has multiple sources and may escape national legislation; therefore, there is a need for more international juridical co-operation as well as the application of existing conventions of the Council of Europe and the United Nations.

VI. Conclusions: Challenges to Democracy in today's Europe

“All of you should find in Strasbourg a centre of re-dedication of values of democracy and freedom, and crossroads of new ideas and new perspectives is the aim of this Summer University for Democracy”

John Hume⁸⁴

The closing ceremony of the Summer University for Democracy took place on July 14, a date symbolic in the French history as a grand commemoration of democracy. Fabienne Keller⁸⁵ opened the closing session with her words of pride for the city of Strasbourg, which hosted and supported the Summer University for Democracy. Strasbourg represents a city of reconciliation between France and Germany after World War II, and hosts numerous European institutions, embodying what Fabienne Keller called, *“the Europe of Strasbourg”*. As she reminded, peace, democracy and the rule of law on the European continent are fragile and should not be taken for granted. Strasbourg provides a much needed place for dialogue among various nations, and by supporting the Summer University for Democracy of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg hopes to contribute to the consolidation of democracy in countries that currently undergo a difficult process of democratic transition.

John Hume, whose lifelong quest has been the attainment of peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, as well, paid his tributes to Strasbourg for giving him the inspiration and hope when peace had seemed unattainable. He expressed his hope that the Schools of Political Studies would help nurture the leadership that is much needed, especially in the countries with persisting ethnic conflicts. Pointing to the case of Northern Ireland as an example, he sent out a message of hope to the participants of the Summer University: *“Democratic stability, economic reform, wealth creation and wealth sharing, conflict resolution and reconciliation are all achievable and attainable goals”*. The problems that many countries are facing may be tackled, according to John Hume, by the establishment and respect of the three principles of the EU: respect for difference (e.g. race, religion or nationality), the institutions that respect difference (e.g. proportional parliamentary system), as well as the *“healing process, which means working together in a common interest – spilling our sweat, not blood”*. These principles are necessary to face the main challenge lying ahead of Europe, which is, *“to create a world, in which there is no longer any war or any conflict”*.

Democracy can be seen as a tool to solve conflicts, and Catherine Lalumière⁸⁶ noted in her speech that pluralist democracies usually favour peaceful solutions to conflicts by means of dialogue and peaceful negotiations. During the last twenty years, one could observe what she called, the *“triumph of democracy”*, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Revolutions in the then Romania and Czechoslovakia, and the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991. Many Central and Eastern European Countries have made a tremendous progress towards democracy by establishing the *“mechanics of democracy”* such as direct elections and universal suffrage, existence of multiple political parties, or freedom and pluralism of the media. Yet, Catherine Lalumière poses a question: why are we speaking of the crisis of democracy despite all the apparent success of democracy for the last twenty years? Often, one forgets that democracy is not only about the mechanics or fulfilling the formal conditions; democracy needs content, or *“values which give meaning to democracy”* – liberty, human rights, rule of law, respect for minorities among many others. Most importantly, as

84. Nobel Peace Prize-Winner

85. Senator Mayor of Strasbourg

86. former Secretary General of the Council of Europe

Sonja Licht⁸⁷ said in her closing speech, democracy needs people who would respect these values: *“There is a lot said about the need of institution-building and democracy building but often it is forgotten that for all this we need people; we need a new generation of political and civic leaders, media and business leaders in order to make these democratic principles the guiding values of our societies”*.

Goran Svilanovic⁸⁸ and Irakli Alasania⁸⁹ each in their manner emphasised the role of the EU support for the countries in transition and warned against the dangers of building a *“fortress Europe”*. Both speakers noted that despite the enlargement fatigue in many of the EU countries, Europe should keep its open-door policy and encourage strong political leadership. As Goran Svilanovic said, *“It takes leadership and communication and creativity to convince voters that the big united Europe is far more of a political idea than the swinging will of European voters”*. Since Serbia and Georgia, among other countries in transition, are asked to demonstrate leadership in order to conduct complex reforms and solve conflicts, Europe, on its part, should give strong signals of support to the new democracies, reassuring that the *“open door is still there”*. As Irakli Alasania noted, *“We cannot change the past, but we can change the future, and the future is about sharing – sharing security, democratic experience and human resources”*.

Yet, it is not only the new democracies that face difficulties; the “old democracies” as well as European institutions are also said to undergo the crisis of democracy. Catherine Lalumière outlined two sets of factors that may be held responsible for the crisis of democracy – internal and external factors. From the inside, representative democracy may be harmed by corruption or by the incompetence of the elected leaders who are unable to resolve social and economic problems. As a result, people may become more open to alternative solutions supporting populism or an authoritarian regime. Another internal threat to democracy involves identity reclaiming – whether national, regional, linguistic, religious or cultural. While reclaiming one’s identity may be seen as fair since it provides for cultural diversity and guarantees people the right to decide their own destiny, it may also have negative effects, such as the proliferation of micro-states with a strong feeling of belonging to a group, where everyone is the same and closed to others. History has shown how easily such “ego-centrism” may give rise to nationalism, xenophobia, intolerance and racism. Among the external threats to democracy, Catherine Lalumière mentioned the threat of a military attack by a certain aggressive state, the threat of terrorism as well as the economic, social and political effects of globalisation. When faced with a brutal force, democracies cannot stay passive but should have a clear political will, strong civil society as well as military force, without which the law is powerless. Speaking of terrorism, she warned against the abuse of human rights and restriction of liberties in the fight against terrorism. The effects of globalisation, on their part, may have enormous destabilising effects pushing people to extremism.

To conclude, Catherine Lalumière offered several indispensable conditions for democracy, *“the fertile land without which democracy dies or becomes deformed”*. Certain sociological conditions are needed for democracy to flourish, one of which is the existence of *demos*: *“What counts is that there exists a group, the members of which share a real feeling of belonging, and who are sufficiently solidary in order to express the common will and to respect the rules of the game, established together”*. Other conditions are of a psychological nature: namely, democracy needs citizens, or *“individuals who are conscious of their collective responsibilities and acting in the interest of the group”*. Citizen probity and education are absolutely necessary for a well-functioning democracy, since corruption is a serious undermining factor for democracy, destroying people’s trust in the political system as well as diminishing the effectiveness of public policies. Furthermore, democracy cannot function well in a poor society distraught with inequalities: where redistribution of wealth is not done properly, one can only speak of a caricature of democracy. Finally, democracy is based on certain values, the most important of which is the recognition of human dignity.

87. Director of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence

88. former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro

89. Georgia’s Ambassador to the United Nations

Most of the speakers underlined the importance to respect difference; thus, while democracy is about the majority rule, democracy should also assure the protection of minorities. Sonja Licht in her closing speech praised the slogan “*All Different – All Equal*” of the European Youth Campaign for Diversity, Human Rights and Participation, displayed in front of the Council of Europe. This slogan, points to the main challenge to democracy in today's Europe – the challenge to create tolerant societies, where everybody has their place.

Annex I: Programme of the Summer University for Democracy

Palais de l'Europe – Hemicycle

Monday, 10 July 2006

10.00 Opening

Mr Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe

Mr Alexandre Orlov, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe on behalf of the Russian Federation Chair of the Committee of Ministers

Mr Bruno Gain, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the Council of Europe on behalf of the host country of the Council of Europe

Mr Pascal Mangin, Deputy Mayor, Strasbourg

Ms Elena Nemirovskaya, Director and Founder of the Moscow School of Political Studies

11.00 Opening lecture

Mr Serguei Stanishev, Prime Minister of Bulgaria

12.30 Lunch

Restaurant of the European Parliament

14.30 Conference I

“New challenges to democracy and human rights in today’s Europe”

Chair: Ms Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe

Moderator: Mr Vladimir Lukin, Commissioner on Human Rights of the Russian Federation

Mr Milan Kucan, former President of Slovenia

Ms Annelise Oeschger, President of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe

Ms Svetlana Smirnova, Member of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Mr Zarko Puhovski, President of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Croatia

18.00 Reception offered by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

Restaurant Bleu, Palais de l'Europe

Tuesday, 11 July 2006

09.00 Workshops or study visits*

12.30 Lunch
Restaurant of the European Parliament

14.30 Conference II “European strategies: joint action, present and future”

Chair: Mr Bernard Schreiner, Vice-President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Moderator: Mr Adrian Severin, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Romania

Mr Michel Caillouet, Ambassador, Representative of the European Commission to the Council of Europe

Mr Michail Margelov, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of Russia

Mr François Heisbourg, Special Adviser to the Strategic Institute, Paris

Mr Jacques Paul Klein, former Under-Secretary-General of UN and former Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Liberia

Ms Yoko Iwama, Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo

20.00 Reception hosted by the Permanent Representations

Wednesday , 12 July 2006

09.00 Workshops or study visits*

12.30 Lunch
Restaurant of the European Parliament

14.30 Conference III “Directing action by the authorities : good governance”

Chair: Mr Antoine Durrleman, Director of the National School of Administration (ENA), France

Ms Kim Campbell, former Prime Minister of Canada

Mr Jean-Dominique Giuliani, President of the Robert Schuman Foundation, Paris

Mr Giovanni di Stasi, former President of the Congress, Council of Europe

Mr Otmar Philipp, Administrator, European Parliament

Mr Robert Hertzog, Professor of Public Law, Institute of Political Studies, Robert Schuman University, Strasbourg

20.00 Buffet-dinner offered by the City of Strasbourg
Restaurant “A l’Ancienne Douane”

Thursday , 13 July 2006

09.00 Workshops or study visits*

12.30 Lunch
Restaurant of the European Parliament

14.30 Workshops or study visits*

Friday, 14 July 2006

10.00 Closing Session

Mr Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe

Ms Fabienne Keller, Senator Mayor of Strasbourg

Ms Catherine Lalumière, former Secretary General of the Council of Europe

Mr Goran Svilanovic, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro

Mr John Hume, Nobel Peace Prize-Winner

Contribution by **Mr Irakli Alasania**, Ambassador of Georgia to the United Nations

Interventions by representatives of the Schools of Political Studies

Closing remarks by **Ms Sonja Licht**, Director of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence

Adoption of the Final Declaration

Award of Certificates

Closing of the Summer University by **Mr Terry Davis**, Secretary General of the Council of Europe

19.00 Garden party

Jardin des Deux Rives

Saturday, 15 July 2006

Departure of the participants

* Study visits to the European Court of Human Rights, ARTE, Eurocorps, Strasbourg Town Hall, Conseil Régional d'Alsace or Conseil général du Bas-Rhin

Challenges to Democracy in today's Europe Workshops and Study Visits

MOSCOW

Conference III: "Directing action by the authorities: good governance"

Workshop 1. Responsible leadership at local and regional level: the political challenge of local self-government

1a. Local governance and citizens' participation

Moderator: Mr Jean-Marie Woehrling

Workshop 2. Policies for public probity

2a. To reform the public administration: between ethics and effectiveness

Moderators: Mr Cyril Clément, Mr Stéphane Leyenberger

Study visit: Town Hall

Experience of participative democracy

Ms Anne Schumann, Deputy Mayor of Strasbourg

TBILISI

Conference II: "European strategies: joint action, present and future"

Workshop 1. Joint analysis and action as a means of fostering integration

1a. Identity and citizenship

Moderators: Mr Irakli Alasania, Mr Bruno Cautrès, Ms Mary-Ann Hennessey

Workshop 2. European security and defence

2b. Energy security: between competition and co-operation

Moderators: Mr Cyrille Gloaguen, Mr Philippe Sébille-Lopez

Study visit: Eurocorps

A European defence instrument

Mr Fernando Olalde, Press Officer

SOFIA

Conference I: "New challenges to democracy and human rights in today's Europe"

Workshop 1. Lessons to be drawn from democratic processes: the challenge of participation

1b. Electoral participation

Moderators: Mr Serguei Kouznetsov, Mr Christian Saves

Workshop 2. Democracy and the challenge of diversity

2b. Democratic pluralism and freedom of expression: the Media

Moderators : Mr Bogdan Bogdanov, Mr Pall Thorhallsson

Study visit: Conseil général du Bas-Rhin

Decentralisation

Mr Jean Howiller, Chief of Cabinet

CHISINAU

Conference I: “New challenges to democracy and human rights in today’s Europe”

Workshop 1. Lessons to be drawn from democratic processes: the challenge of participation

1a. Civil society against the democratic deficit?

Moderators: Mr Daniel Zielinski, Ms Dorota Dakowska

Workshop 2. Democracy and the challenge of diversity

2a. Social cohesion and social inclusion as preconditions for the democratic process?

Moderators: Mr Jean-Marie Heydt, Ms Alexandra Nacu

Study visit: Conseil général du Bas-Rhin

Decentralisation

Mr Jean Howiller, Chief of Cabinet

PRISTINA

Conference III: “Directing action by the authorities: good governance”

Workshop 1. Responsible leadership at local and regional level: the political challenge of local self-government

1b. Local governance and reinforcement of local and regional executives

Moderators: Mr Jean-Paul Chauvet, Mr Owen Masters

Workshop 2. Policies for public probity

2b. Financing of political parties

Moderators: Mr Tiziano Balmelli, Mr Alexander Seger

Study visit: Conseil Régional d’Alsace

Transborder cooperation

Mr Pierre Meyer, Director

SKOPJE

Conference III: “Directing action by the authorities: good governance”

Workshop 1. Responsible leadership at local and regional level: the political challenge of local self-government

1a. Local governance and citizens’ participation

Moderators: Ms Nadia Cuk, Ms Valérie Lozac’h

Workshop 2. Policies for public probity

2b. Financing of political parties

Moderators: Mr Yves-Marie Doublet, Mr Wolfgang Rau

Study visit: ENA (Ecole Nationale d’Administration)

Administrative reform and reform of the French civil service

Mr Renaud Dorandeu, Director of studies

BELGRADE

Conference II: “European strategies: joint action, present and future”

- Workshop 1. Joint analysis and action as a means of fostering integration
- 1b. Which European model(s) of social and economic integration?
Moderators: Mr Michel Dévoluy, Mr Klaus Schumann

- Workshop 2. European security and defence
- 2a. Political frameworks for European security and defence
Moderator: Mr Hans-Peter Furrer

Study visit: Town Hall

Experience of participative democracy

Ms Anne Schumann, Deputy Mayor of Strasbourg

ZAGREB

Conference II: “European strategies: joint action, present and future”

- Workshop 1. Joint analysis and action as a means of fostering integration
- 1b. Which European model(s) of social and economic integration?
Moderator: Mr Federico Oliveri

- Workshop 2. European security and defence
- 2b. Energy security: between competition and co-operation
Moderator: Mr Jean Lamy

Study visit: ARTE (French-German TV channel)

The European cultural channel

Mr Vladimir Vasak, journalist

BUCHAREST

Conference I: “New challenges to democracy and human rights in today’s Europe”

- Workshop 1. Lessons to be drawn from democratic processes: the challenge of participation
- 1a. Civil society against the democratic deficit?
Moderators: Ms Claudia Luciani, Ms Karin Nordmeyer

- Workshop 2. Democracy and the challenge of diversity
- 2b. Democratic pluralism and freedom of expression: the Media
Moderators: Mr Renaud de La Brosse, Mr Saso Ordanovski

Study visit: ARTE (French-German TV channel)

The European cultural channel

Mr Vladimir Vasak, journalist

YEREVAN

Conference I: “New challenges to democracy and human rights in today’s Europe”

Workshop 1. Lessons to be drawn from democratic processes: the challenge of participation

1b. Electoral participation

Moderators: Mr Shavarsh Kocharyan, Mr Michael Remmert

Workshop 2. Democracy and the challenge of diversity

2b. Democratic pluralism and freedom of expression: the Media

Moderators: Mr Hugues Jardel, Mr Vardan Poghosyan

Study visit: ARTE (French-German TV channel)

The European cultural channel

Mr Vladimir Vasak, journalist

KIEV

Conference III: “Directing action by the authorities: good governance”

Workshop 1. Responsible leadership at local and regional level: the political challenge of local self-government

1b. Local governance and reinforcement of local and regional executives

Moderators: Mr Robert Hertzog, Mr Artemy Karpenko

Workshop 2. Policies for public probity

2a. To reform the public administration: between ethics and effectiveness

Moderator: Mr Christophe Bonnotte

Study visit: Conseil Régional d’Alsace

Transborder cooperation

Mr Pierre Meyer, Director

List of moderators

Irakli Alasania, Adviser to the President of Georgia

Tiziano Balmelli, Lecturer, University of Freiburg

Bogdan Bogdanov, Professor, President of the New Bulgarian University, Sofia

Christophe Bonnotte, Deputy Secretary General of Europa, Limoges

Bruno Cautres, Senior Lecturer, Institute of Political Studies, Paris

Jean-Paul Chauvet, Council of Europe, Secretariat of the Congress

Cyril Clement, Senior Lecturer in public law, University of Paris VIII

Nadia Cuk, Field Office of the Council of Europe, Belgrade

Dorota Dakowska, Lecturer and researcher in political science, University of Paris X

Michel Devoluy, Professor of economics, Robert Schuman University, Strasbourg

Renaud Dorandeu, Director of studies, Ecole nationale d'Administration, Strasbourg

Yves-Marie Doublet, National Assembly, Paris

Renaud de La Brosse, Senior Lecturer, University of Reims

Hans-Peter Furrer, former Director General of Political Affairs of the Council of Europe

Cyrille Gloaguen, Researcher, French Institute of Geopolitics, University of Paris VIII

Mary-Ann Hennessey, Council of Europe, Directorate General of Political Affairs

Robert Hertzog, Professor of public law, Institute of Political Studies, Strasbourg

Jean-Marie Heydt, Vice-President of the INGO liaison committee, Council of Europe

Jean Howiller, Chief of Cabinet, Conseil général du Bas-Rhin

Hugues Jardel, Deputy editor in chief, ARTE, Strasbourg

Artemy Karpenko, Council of Europe, Directorate General I - Legal Affairs

Shavarsh Kocharyan, Member of the Parliament of Armenia

Serguei Kouznetsov, Council of Europe, Secretariat of Venice Commission

Jean Lamy, Head of Office of International Strategy, Directorate General of Energy and Raw material, Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry, Paris

Stéphane Leyenberger, Council of Europe, Directorate General I - Legal Affairs

Valérie Lozac'h, Senior Lecturer, Institute of Political Studies, Strasbourg

Claudia Luciani, Council of Europe, Directorate General of Political Affairs

Owen Masters, former Member of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Council of Europe

Pierre Meyer, Director, Conseil Régional d'Alsace

Alexandra Nacu, Lecturer and researcher, Institute of Political Studies, Paris

Karin Nordmeyer, President of UNIFEM Germany, Freiburg

Fernando Olalde, Press Officer, Eurocorps

Federico Oliveri, Council of Europe, Directorate General of Social Cohesion

Saso Ordanovski, Journalist, Skopje

Vardan Poghosyan, Expert, Yerevan

Wolfgang Rau, Council of Europe, Directorate General I - Legal Affairs

Michael Remmert, Council of Europe, Directorate General of Political Affairs

Christian Saves, Researcher in political science, Ecole Nationale d'Administration, Strasbourg

Anne Schumann, Deputy Mayor of Strasbourg

Klaus Schumann, former Director General of Political Affairs of the Council of Europe

Philippe Sébille-Lopez, Researcher, French Institute of Geopolitics, University of Paris VIII

Alexander Seger, Council of Europe, Directorate General I - Legal Affairs

Pall Thorhallsson, Council of Europe, Directorate General of Human Rights

Vladimir Vasak, journalist, ARTE

Jean-Marie Woehrling, Secretary General, Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine, Strasbourg

Daniel Zielinski, Delegate General, UNCCAS, Lille

Annex II: List of Participants

Moscow School of Political Studies

1. Mr Maxim Andreev (Pskov region), Editor of “Navigator” political information agency
2. Mr Kirill Balmin (Moscow), Director of “Open Regions” NGO
3. Mr Mikhail Belgorokov (Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria), Director of “Culture, Science and Education” regional foundation
4. Mr Ivan Bogdanov (Stavropol region), Deputy, Regional Parliament
5. Mr Ivan Burmistrov (Kaluga region), Deputy, Kaluga City Duma
6. Mr Maxim Burmitsky (Kemerovo region), Chairman, Interregional non-profit organisation “South-Siberian Human Rights Centre”
7. Mrs Rumaniyat Elmurzaeva (Republic of Dagestan), Editor-in-Chief of “Novoe Delo” weekly newspaper
8. Mr Dmitry Gorin (Bryansk region), Member of the Commission on Human Rights, Regional Administration
9. Mrs Tatyana Gorkunova (Sverdlovsk region), Chief Executive of “So-deystvie Centre” non-profit organisation
10. Mrs Kira Grosheva (Moscow), Expert of “Rosbusinessconsulting” Company
11. Mr Vasily Gvozdev (Ulyanovsk region), Chairman, Ulyanovsk City Duma
12. Mr Andrey Ignatyev (Kostroma region), Deputy, Kostroma City Council
13. Mr Vadim Karastelev (Krasnodar region), Head of the Novorossiysk Committee on Human Rights
14. Mr Alexei Kleshko (Krasnoyarsk region), Deputy, Regional Legislative Assembly
15. Mrs Irina Kosterina (Ulyanovsk region), Senior expert of “Region” research and development centre
16. Mr Aleksey Koz’ymin (Irkutsk region), Deputy, Regional Parliament
17. Mr Dmitry Kuznetsov (Tyumen region), Chairman, “My Generation” regional public youth organisation
18. Mr Maxim Ladilov (Republic of Chuvashia), Deputy, Cheboksary City Council
19. Mrs Elena Lebedeva (Altai region), Director, Local branch of the University of the Russian Academy of Education
20. Mrs Yana Lobastova (Krasnodar region), Chairman of “Journalists’ Guild” public organisation
21. Mr Alexandr Lukichev (Vologda region), Chairman, Vologda City Duma
22. Mr Alexey Malov (Pskov region), Co-ordinator of “Center of Social Designing Vozrozhdenie” international projects
23. Mr Dmitry Malyutin (Perm region), Deputy, Perm City Council

24. Mrs Elena Nemirovskaya (Moscow), Founder and Director of the Moscow School of Political Studies
25. Mr Ilya Neustroev (Perm region), Deputy, Regional Parliament
26. Mr Sergey Obertas (Chelyabinsk region), PR Chief Manager of Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Factory
27. Mr Maxim Osovsky (Republic of Mordovia), Executive Director, Regional branch of SPS political party
28. Mr Boris Pashtov (Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria), Deputy, Republican Parliament
29. Mr Alexander Peshkov (Nizhny Novgorod region), Co-ordinator of interregional charitable programs
30. Mr Olga Pogonina (Moscow), PR-Manager, “Novoye Literaturnoye Obozrenie” publishing house
31. Mr Valery Pryzhkov (Kaliningrad region), President of “Young politicians’ regional club”
32. Mr Andrey Raev (Republic of Karelia), Adviser, Press-cutting service of the Republic Government
33. Mr Sergey Savchenko (Moscow), Interpreter
34. Mr Evgeny Semenichin (Altai region), Deputy, Regional Parliament
35. Mr Yuriy Senokosov (Moscow), Director of the publishing program, Moscow School of Political Studies
36. Mr Evgeny Senyshin (Sverdlovsk region), Editor of “Expert of Urals” weekly magazine
37. Mr Maxim Sergeev (Sverdlovsk region), Deputy, Novouralsk City Council
38. Mr Gennady Sheida (Altay region), Head of the Altay regional branch of Russian Public Political Centre
39. Mr Borislav Skuratov (Chuvashia Republic), Deputy, City Council
40. Mr Yury Strakhov (Leningrad region), Deputy, Regional Parliament
41. Mr Alexander Sysoev (Voronezh region), Deputy, Voronezh City Council
42. Mrs Olga Timofeeva (Stavropol region), Producer of special projects, “ABT-Stavropol” TV company
43. Mrs Yuliya Tomashevskaya (Moscow), Manager of the Moscow School of Political Studies
44. Mrs Marina Tonkikh (Moscow), Manager of the Moscow School of Political Studies
45. Mrs Elena Uglanova (Moscow) Expert of the Russian State Duma, Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation
46. Mr Oleg Vasilyev (Republic of Mary-El), Deputy, Republican Parliament
47. Mrs Yulia Yudina (Yaroslavl region), Executive Director, “Foundation of the Regional Development Support – Yaroslavl”
48. Mrs Andrey Yurov (Voronezh region), President of the International Youth Human Rights Movement
49. Mr Igor Zaborsky (Arkhangelsk region), Head of Administration of Menzensky district
50. Mrs Elvira Zhabalieva (Moscow), Senior lecturer, All-Russian State Tax Academy under the Ministry of Finance, Chair of state-legal disciplines

Tbilisi School of Political Studies

1. Mr Armaz Akhvlediani, Director of the Tbilisi School of Political Studies
2. Mr Irakli Alasania, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Georgia to the UN; Special Representative of the President of Georgia for Abkhazia
3. Mrs Ia Antadze, Journalist of the Radio «Liberty»
4. Mr George Asatiani, Director - general of the «KWK» Group
5. Mrs Ia Barateli, Journalist of the TV «Alania»
6. Mr David Berdzenishvili, Member of the Parliament of Georgia
7. Mr Koba Chkheidze, Executive Secretary of the «New Society Institute»
8. Mr Nika Chitadze, Chairman of the George Marshall Centre Alumni Association
9. Mr Nikoloz Gamkrelidze, Director of the Health Project of the «BCI» Insurance Company
10. Mr Koba Gabisonia, Executive Director of the Georgian Distribution Company
11. Mr Levan Geradze, Chief Specialist of the Office of the State Minister for Conflict Resolution
12. Mr George Gogashvili, Expert of the TSPS on Military and National Security Issues, Brigade General Retired
13. Mr Alexander Alavidze, Director of the Ltd «Vazoil»
14. Mrs Nata Imedaishvili, Journalist of the Radio «Liberty»
15. Mr George Janashia, Consultant of the «Silk Road Group»
16. Mrs Irma Jokiladze, Programme Editor of the Adjara TV
17. Mr Gurman Kunchulia, Chief Specialist of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
18. Mr George Khizanishvili, Director of the Legal Provision Department of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Georgia
19. Mr Mate Kirvalidze, Chief Editor of the Information Service of the «Imedi» TV
20. Mr Giga Kobaladze, Defence-Lawyer
21. Mrs Nino Kvatadze, Journalist of the «Deutsche Welle»
22. Mr George Jalabadze, Journalist of the «Internews-Georgia»
23. Mr Juba Maruashvili, Student of the Tbilisi State University
24. Mr Gocha Megrelidze, Expert of the TSPS on the Economic Security
25. Mr George Megrelishvili, Director of the Finance Department of the «Iberiatel» Ltd
26. Mrs Lili Mskhiladze, Judge
27. Mr Giorgi Oniani, Assistant to Prime-Minister of Georgia
28. Mrs Nino Oniani, Chief Specialist of the «Axisi» Company
29. Mr George Paniashvili, Head of the Division of the Co-ordination of International Relations of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia
30. Mrs Ekaterine Pirtskhalava, Lecturer of the Tbilisi State University
31. Mrs Khatuna Samnidze, Member of the Supreme Council of Adjara AR
32. Mr Mikheil Nishnianidze, Executive Director of the «Lingvoexpress»
33. Mr Otar Siradze, Governor of the Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo-Svaneti Region

34. Mrs Tamar Siria, Defence-Lawyer
35. Mr Gogita Sozashvili, Chief Specialist of the Small Business Centre
36. Mr Zurab Tatishvili, Lecturer of the Tbilisi State University
37. Mr George Tkheldze, Director General of the «Aldagi» Insurance Company
38. Mrs Natia Tskepladze, Judge of the Supreme Court of Georgia
39. Mr Tornike Turmanidze, Analyst of the Department for Analysis Co-ordination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
40. Mrs Irma Zoidze, Chief Specialist of the Centre for International Education

Bulgarian School of Politics

1. Mr Ahmedov Erdoan, economist
2. Mr Avramov Aleksandar, political analyst
3. Mr Bali Solomon, economist
4. Mr Blagoev Stanislav, financier
5. Mr Bogdanov Bogdan, professor , President New Bulgarian University
6. Mr Chokoyska Ivon, marketing
7. Mr Nikolaev Viktor, journalist
8. Ms Dimitrova Denitsa, economist
9. Mr Dobrev Kiril, economist, MP
10. Ms Draganova Albena, lawyer
11. Mr Dzhambazki Angel, lawyer
12. Ms Eskova Rositsa, teacher
13. Ms Filipova Filipina, interpreter
14. Mr Gangarlak Ahmed, student, social affairs
15. Mr Georgiev Georgi, zoo engineer
16. Mr Georgiev Georgi, economist
17. Ms Hantova Petya, lawyer
18. Mr Hayrula Erdinch, engineer
19. Mr Ivanov Ivan, organisational consultant
20. Ms Ivanova Maria, doctor
21. Mr Kostadinov Kostadin, Balkan analyst
22. Ms Kovatcheva – Karadzhova Diana, lawyer
23. Mr Kutev Anton, culturologist
24. Mr Kuvandzha Sherif, pedagogical expert
25. Ms Kuzmanova Ani, economist
26. Ms Lomeva Svetlana, political analyst, Director of the Bulgarian School of Politics
27. Ms Lozanova Denitsa, economist
28. Ms Manolova Maya, lawyer, MP

29. Ms Marinova Anna, psychologist
30. Mr Milev Radoslav, economist
31. Ms Milusheva Tsetska, police, officer
32. Ms Mustafova Fatme, pedagogical expert
33. Ms Nenova Neli, economist
34. Mr Panchev Ventseslav, psychologist
35. Mr Panitza Dimi, Founder of the Bulgarian School of Politics
36. Mr Petrov Kaloyan, lawyer
37. Ms Petrova Adriana, lawyer
38. Ms Poneva Antonela, chemist, MP
39. Ms Raychinova Bilyana, lawyer
40. Ms Slavova Diyana, journalist
41. Ms Smedovska-Toneva Rada, lawyer
42. Mr Spasov Mincho, lawyer, MP
43. Ms Stavreva Petya, journalist
44. Mr Stefanov Stefan, student in law
45. Mr Stoyanov Ivelin, engineer
46. Ms Stoykova Hristina, lawyer
47. Mr Stratev Radion, political analyst
48. Mr Tinchev Vasil, architect
49. Ms Vasileva Ivanka, bank officer
50. Ms Videnova Aglika, lawyer
51. Ms Yankova Romyana, medical aide (nurse)

European Institute for Political Studies in Moldova

1. Mrs Afanasieva Nadejda, Program Co-ordinator, ADEPT
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3. Mrs Balitcaia Victoria, Student
4. Mrs Bejenaru Olga, Economist
5. Mr Bolgar Maxim, Student
6. Mr Buftac Sergiu, Translator
7. Mr Caminschi Vladislav, Manager in electronics student
8. Mrs Chirita Ana, Student
9. Mr Chirtoaca Dorin, Lawyer
10. Mr Chirtoaca Nicolae, Director EISPM, political analyst
11. Mr Cibotaru Viorel, Political Analyst
12. Mr Curnic Sergiu, Lawyer
13. Mr Damaschin Nicolae, TV Producer

14. Mrs Ernu Elena, Professor
15. Mr Esanu Mircea, MA in Sociology
16. Mrs Glavan Angela, Translator
17. Mr Godea Mihai, Director, Centre «Contact»
18. Mr Ionel Sergiu, Program Co-ordinator, European Movement of Moldova
19. Mr Lazarev Alexandru, Student
20. Mr Lisa Ion, Political Advisor
21. Mr Mihaes Roman, Lawyer
22. Mr Neicovcen Serghei, Manager
23. Mr Palihovici Sergiu, Professor
24. Mr Peev Andrei, Manager
25. Mr Popov Andrei, Political analyst
26. Mrs Revenco Ana, Program Co-ordinator EISPM
27. Mr Rosca Ruslan, Investment engineer
28. Mrs Soltan Angela, Translator
29. Mrs Straton Olga, Program Co-ordinator, LADOM
30. Mrs Turcanu Vera, Bureau member Youth Council
31. Mrs Vizitiu Diana, Professor
32. Mr Zubcu Victor, Political scientist

Pristina Institute for Political Studies

1. Mr Ahmeti Adnan, Political Sciences Studies , Prime Minister's Office, Capacity Building Officer
2. Mr Arcis Nebojsa, Engineer, Conference Interpreter
3. Ms Bajraktari Ilirijana, Doctor of Medicine, NGO «ATRC»
4. Ms Bajrami Zana, Economist, MA European Studies, Office for European Integration, Ministry of Mine and Energy
5. Ms Bozovic Ksenija, Economist, Member of DS
6. Ms Bukoshi Rudina, Language Studies, Member of Parliament, LDK
7. Mr Cakolli Bujar, BA Political Science, Member of PDK Council
8. Mr Gashi Nderim, Law Studies, Member of LDK Council
9. Mr Halimi Fisnik, MA Political Science, Reformist Party ORA, Secretary and Member of Presidency
10. Ms Hasani Arjeta, Journalist, PIPS Project Assistant
11. Mr Jakupi Ilir, Language Studies, Conference Interpreter
12. Mr Kabashaj Safet, Political Science Studies, Editor in Chief of Blue Sky Radio
13. Mr Kervan Enis, Language Studies, Political Advisor, Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport
14. Mr Kerveshi Kujtim, LL.M. in International and European Law, First Legal Adviser, Ministry of Legal Affairs, First Legal Advisor of the AAK President

15. Mr Krasniqi Valbon, Medical Studies, Doctor, Member of LDK Youth Forum
16. Mr Krasniqi Kushtrim, BA Political Sciences, Executive Director «West Balkan Initiative»
17. Ms Kryeziu Leonora, MA Philological Science, PIPS Executive Director
18. Mr Kryeziu Nijazi, Political Sciences Studies, Head of Campaign and Training Office of PDK
19. Ms Kryeziu Vlora, Language Studies, Member of ORA Committee
20. Mr Latifi Liridon, Political Science Studies, Intern at Prime Minister's Office
21. Mr Matoshi Albin, Fine Art Studies, Program Co-ordinator, NGO «Cohu»
22. Ms Mjekiqi Shqipe, Political Science Studies, Protocol Officer, President's Office
23. Mr Mjeku Lulzim, Journalist, Newspaper «Lajm»
24. Mr Morina Rexhep, History Studies, PTK Official
25. Ms Murati Spresa, Medical Studies, Member of Parliament
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27. Mr Rama Ilir, Economist, MA European Studies, Head of Office for Co-operation with Donors, Ministry of Mine and Energy
28. Ms Rexhaj Arjeta, Medical Faculty, BA Political Sciences, Gender Training and Research Centre, Executive Director, ADK party
29. Mr Ristic Sasa, «Law Studies, Legal Assistant, Judicial Integration Section, UNMIK - Department of Justice»
30. Mr Shehu Ilir, Political Science Studies, Head of Minister's Cabinet, Ministry of Mine and Energy
31. Mr Sinani Nezir, Language Studies, KEK Stakeholders Manager
32. Mr Stojanovic Nenad, Journalist, Member of DS
33. Mr Syla Valon, Journalist, Marketing Director for the daily newspaper «Express»
34. Mr Sylejmani Flakron, Law Studies, LDK Parliamentary Group Assistant
35. Mr Thaci Arben, Language Studies, Conference Interpreter
36. Ms Valla-Efendija Anda, Law Studies, Trainer for World Learning
37. Ms Xharra Arbana, Journalist, Daily newspaper «KOHA DITORE»

Skopje School of Politics

1. Mr Toni Ajtovski, Journalist
2. Ms Despina Angelovski, Theatrolgist, interpretation
3. Ms Gordana Apostolovska, cabinet of the Prime Minister
4. Mr Vanja Atanasov, Lawyer
5. Ms Sonja Bajdeska, Deputy Head of Policy, Planning and International Co-operation Sector in the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia
6. Mr Erkan Baljaži, Lawyer
7. Ms Selvet Baruti, Student, works in the General Secretariat of the Government
8. Mr Ivan Cvetkovski, Professor

9. Mr Naser Demiri, Junior assistant in the Ministry of Finance
10. Mr Rejhan Durmisi, Pedagogical expert
11. Mr Dejan Gjorsoski, Economy adviser in the Delegation of the European Commission
12. Ms Hulija Hilmi, Project Manager at Forum- CSRD, Executive Director of the School of Politics
13. Mr Adi Ibraimi, Student
14. Mr Nuredin Isejnovski, Teacher
15. Ms Sonja Ismail, Project Assistant at Forum- CSRD, Moderator in the School of Politics
16. Mr Gjuner Ismail, Director of Forum-CSR, President of the Board of the School of Politics
17. Ms Magdalena Jocevaska, Lawyer
18. Ms Advije Jonus, Pedagogical expert
19. Ms Lucija Jovanovik-Osavkov, Mechanical Engineer
20. Mr Miko Kacarski, Economist, works as an auditor at the Macedonian Audit Centre
21. Mr Dejan Kalamadevski, Junior assistant in the local administration
22. Ms Natasa Kolekevaska-Georgievska, Project Manager at Forum - CSRD, interpreter
23. Mr Kostadin Kus-Ivanov, European Integrations Sector at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
24. Ms Maja Lazareska, member of the Council of the Municipality of Kicevo
25. Mr Dejan Lazarovski, Instructor for International Border Co-operation – Interior Ministry – Sector for Border Issues
26. Mr Artan Limani, Lawyer, General Secretariat of the Government
27. Mr Atanas Minov, Adviser at the European Integrations Sector at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
28. Ms Biljana Mufisovska, Professor of English language
29. Mr Nikola Naumoski, Student, works as a NGO activist
30. Ms Frosina Petrusevska, works at «Komercijalna Banka» - Kumanovo. Member of Kumanovo Municipality Council, member of the SDSM's Central Board and women's co-ordinative body
31. Ms Gjultene Sali, Professor of French language
32. Mr Norik Selimi, Student, works as a NGO activist
33. Ms Tanja Setlova, Pedagogical expert
34. Mr Sedat Shaban, Publisher, theologian
35. Mr Gjoko Tasev, Manager of the «Tikves» Plant - Kavadarci
36. Mr Bojan Zahariev, Political analyst
37. Mr Blagoj Zasov, Ambassador, Director of the School of Politics

Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence

1. Mr Babic David, Member of the SPO Executive Board, Member of the City of Belgrade Board
2. Ms Banovic Donka, MP in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (Chair of the Committee on Education, Member of the Committee on Poverty Reduction), Member of the DSS Main Board, President of the Pirot County Board

3. Ms Beljan Balaban Jadranka, MP in the Assembly of AP Vojvodina (Chair of the Gender Equality Committee, Member of the Committee on Education, Science, Culture, Youth and Sport), Head of the G17 Plus Parliamentary Group, Vice-President of the G17 Plus Gender Equality Committee, Member of Vojvodina Provincial Board Presidency
4. Mr Capo Dejan, MP in Assembly of AP Vojvodina (Member of the European Integration Committee and Committee for Administration and Organization of Local Self-Government), Member of the LSV Executive Board
5. Ms Dakic Biljana, Development Director, Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence
6. Ms Dedovic Ivana, General Secretariat of the President of the Republic of Serbia
7. Mr Delibasic Ivan, Member of the G17 Plus Foreign Affairs Committee, Member of Vracar Municipality Board
8. Ms Djureta Valentina, Administrative Officer, Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence
9. Ms Djurisc Radmila, Counsellor for International Co-operation, Chief of Staff in the Office of the President of SNP
10. Mr Dulic Oliver, Former MP in the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro (Chair of the Committee on European Integrations), Deputy in Subotica Municipality, Member of the DS Presidency, Vice-President of the Vojvodina Provincial Board
11. Mr Gjokaj Leon, Project Co-ordinator, Nansen Dialogue Centre, Montenegro
12. Mr Gracanin Dragan, Program Manager, Roma Centre for Democracy
13. Ms Grbic Ivana, G17 Plus Spokesperson
14. Mr Grujic Mladen, Former MP in the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro (Member of the Committee on Defence), Chair of the SPO-NS Deputy's Group, Vice-President of the City of Belgrade Board
15. Ms Kojic Aleksandra, SPO Spokesperson, Member of the SPO Main Board, General Secretary of the Ministry of Culture
16. Mr Kronja Marko, MP in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (Member of the Committee for Relations with Serbs Living Outside of Serbia), Deputy Director of the Central Electoral Headquarters, Chief of Membership Department
17. Mr Lalosevic Vasilije, MP in the Parliament of the Republic of Montenegro (Member of the Committee on Political System, Justice and Administration), Member of the SNP Executive Board, Deputy in Bar Municipality
18. Mr Lazarevic Aleksandar, MP in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (Member of the Committee on Culture and Information), Member of the G17 Plus Main Board
19. Ms Licht Sonja, President, Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence
20. Ms Marjanovic Vesna, Vice-President of the DS Executive Board, Member of the DS Main Board, Deputy in the Belgrade City Council
21. Ms Markovic Jelena, Advisor to the President of Serbia, Former Deputy Minister of Human and Minority Rights of Serbia and Montenegro
22. Mr Mehonic Almir, Member of SnDP Presidency, Member of the SnDP Main Board, President of the party's Youth Organisation
23. Mr Mijic Predrag, President of Coka Municipality Assembly, Member of the Executive Board of the DS Vojvodina Provincial Board

24. Ms Milivojevic Ksenija, Secretary General of the European Movement in Serbia, Former MP in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (Chair of the Committee on European Integration, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Administration Committee)
25. Mr Misic Ivan, Member of the DS Main Board, President of Youth Council, Member of the DS Belgrade Executive Board
26. Ms Mitrinovic Biljana, Journalist-Columnist, Politika Daily
27. Ms Morvai Horvat Hedvig, Director of the General Secretariat, Citizens Pact for SEE
28. Mr Nikolic Zoran, MP in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (Member of the Committee on Privatization, Committee for Relations with Serbs Living Outside of Serbia, Committee on Development and International Economic Relations), Member of the DSS Executive Board
29. Mr Pejovic Zarija, Economic Analyst, Group for Changes, Montenegro
30. Mr Petrovic Milan, Former MP in the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro (Member of the Committee on Defence), Head of the DSS Parliamentary Group in Knjazevac Municipality Assembly, Member of the DSS Main Board
31. Mr Prodanovic Aleksandar, Former MP in the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro (Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Commission on Control of Security Services), President of Sremska Mitrovica Municipality Assembly, Member of the DS Main Board, Member of the DS Vojvodina Provincial Board
32. Mr Radakovic Dusko, President of the LSV Executive Board, Member of the LSV Presidency and the Main Board, Advisor to the President of the Assembly of AP Vojvodina on Political System Issues
33. Mr Ristic Nemanja, Member of the DSS Main Board, Vice-President of the Youth Council
34. Ms Sijacki Zorana, Advisor on Gender Equality, Provincial Secretariat for Labour, Employment and Gender Equality of Vojvodina
35. Mr Stanimirovic Milan, MP in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (Member of the Committee on Agriculture, Committee for Relations with Serbs Living Outside of Serbia)
36. Mr Stevanic Ivica, Member of the DS Presidency
37. Mr Stojiljkovic Dejan, MP in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (Member of the Youth and Sports Parliamentary Committee, Poverty Reduction Parliamentary Committee), Member of the DSS Main Board, President of the Toplica County Board
38. Mr Tomic Vojkan, MP in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (Member of the Committee on European Integration and Legislative Committee), Member of the DSS Main Board, President of the DSS European Integration Committee
39. Mr Vukovic Vladimir, MP in the Assembly of AP Vojvodina (Member of the Committee on Administration and Mandate-Immunity Issues), Member of the DS Executive Board, Member of the DS Vojvodina Provincial Board

Academy for Political Development (Croatia)

1. Mr Bićanić Denis, sociologist - Croatian Red Cross
2. Ms Bilandžić Dubravka, Economist, Siemens, Corporate Strategy
3. Mr Cvetojević Saša, b.sc.e., Croatian Association of Employers
4. Ms Đokić Jović Jelena, Bachelor of Law, SDF (Serbian Democratic Forum)
5. Ms Eljuga Andrijana, Ministry of Finance, Cabinet of the Minister, Adviser to the Minister
6. Ms Grbić Martinović Atana, Civil Peace Worker, "Pax Cheisti"

7. Ms Gujić Vedrana, student, International Officer, Croatian People's Party Youth
8. Mr Hajduković Domagoj, Teacher, SDP, Social Democratic Party of Croatia
9. Ms Jožanc Nikolina, Academy for Political development
10. Mr Jurić Damir, Academy for Political development
11. Mr Krunoslav Vidić, Journalist, radio reporter
12. Mr Kunc Davor, Project Manager, Corporate Communications of Atlantic Grupa
13. Ms Lakić Tina, journalist, Jutarhji List (daily Newspaper)
14. Ms Lugarić Marija, Member of Croatian Parliament
15. Mr Milaković Goran, student, human rights activist, Croatian Helsinki Committee
16. Mr Mondekar Daniel, TA at the university/political party leader
17. Mr Mrljić Robert, lawyer, ELIS, Consultancy
18. Ms Novak Jagoda, Researcher and Information Program manager, Centre for Human Rights
19. Mr Pažur Tin, student, political party secretary
20. Mr Pečnik Bojan, Scientist, National Science Foundation / UNI SPLIT
21. Mr Pešut Denis, environmental engineer, Teaching Institute of Public Health, Rijeka
22. Ms Radman Marija, research assistant, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Zagreb
23. Ms Rohatinski Nataša, University lecturer, Head of the Centre for public administration management
24. Ms Škrabalo Marina, consultant, MAP Consulting for Social Development
25. Mr Sočković Krešimir, journalist
26. Ms Svalina Nikolina, Professor, Centre for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights, Osijek
27. Mr Tolušić Tomislav, Lawyer, Local Government (City of Virovitiles)
28. Mr Valentić Tonči, Sociologist, Multimedia Institute
29. Ms Vlašić Feketija, MIRNA, biologist, Government of the Republic of Croatia

“Ovidiu Șincai” European School

1. Ms Abrudan Adina Emilia, Vice-president of the Social Democratic Party Organization, Cluj Municipality
2. Mr Antal Arpad-Andras, MP, Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania
3. Mr Bardoși Costel Daniel, Councillor, Students' Culture House, Tg. Hureș
4. Ms Crișan Raluca, Reporter, Evenimentul Zilei newspaper
5. Mr Cuturela Sandu Cristian, General Manager, Tipoaktis Printing Company
6. Mr Dincă Luigi, Assistant Manager, Ministry of Administration and Interior
7. Mr Docea Lucian Emilian, Executive Director, Monitorul de Alba newspaper
8. Ms Dobre Ana-Maria Marta, Councillor, Ministry of European Integration
9. Ms Farmatu Vasilica Tudora, Parliamentary Expert, Romanian Senate
10. Mrs Gâdea Clitemnestra, Director of Legal Department, Micro Prod
11. Mr Golban Radu, Member of the Democratic Youth Organization, Timiș County

12. Mr Grigorescu Victor, Expert, Ministry of Economy and Commerce
13. Mrs Gurgu Minerva, Physician, Braşov Emergency Hospital
14. Ms Guţă Elena, Chief Accountant, «Ovidiu Şincai» Institute
15. Mr Györke Zoltan, Councillor of the State Secretary for Public Administration, National Liberal Youth
16. Mrs Herki Marta, Assistant Programme Co-ordinator, Centre of Resources for Roma Communities, Cluj County
17. Mr Ioniţă Ion, Chief Editor - Politics, Adevărul newspaper
18. Mr Ivan Cătălin, President of the Social Democratic Youth, Iaşi Municipality
19. Mrs Jugănaru Anne, Director of the «Ovidiu Şincai» European School
20. Ms Jula Camelia Voichiţa, Local Correspondent, Cotidianul newspaper, BBC Radio
21. Mr Şoană Radu-George, President of Pro Humanitas Foundation
22. Mr Lesuţan Ioan, University Lecturer, Western University, Zalău
23. Mrs Marcu Alina, Commercial Director, Medeus Prodimpex Co.
24. Mr Mate Andras-Levente, MP, Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania
25. Ms Mateescu Mirela-Sorina, Parliamentary Expert
26. Ms Matei Roxana, European Integration Expert, Braşov Prefecture
27. Mr Mihalache Dan, MP, Social Democratic Party
28. Mr Mischie Alexandru, Physician
29. Mr Moiceanu Gabriel, President of the Greater Romania Youth Organization, Argeş County
30. Mr Morariu Ştefan, Archdeacon, Tomis Archbishopric
31. Mrs Moruţan Mirela Iustina, Financial Expert, Raiffeisen Bank, Bistriţa
32. Mr Mureşan Adrian Pavel, Vice-president of the Greater Romania Youth Organization, Arad County
33. Mr Murgu Laurenţiu, Parliamentary Expert
34. Ms Opre Ancuţa Gianina, Councillor of the Social Democratic Party President
35. Mr Orăşteanu Sorin Nicolae, IT and Software Engineer
36. Mrs Pădurean Bianca, Reporter, Realitatea TV
37. Ms Păiuşan Cristina Monica, University Lecturer, «Spiru Haret» University
38. Mr Păşcuţă Adrian, County Councillor, Greater Romania Party, Timiş
39. Mr Popa Radu, Department Chief, Romanian Commodities Exchange
40. Mr Prodan Stan, Chief of Senatorial Bureau, Conservative Party, Teleorman County
41. Mr Răcăuţanu Aurel, Manager, Moldave Ranch
42. Mr Rista Adrian, President of the Association for Civic Rights, Arad
43. Ms Roatiş Emilia Elena, Chief of Political Department, Rompres News Agency
44. Mr Sogor Csaba, Senator, Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania
45. Mrs Stanciu-Gorun Elena Silvia, Local Correspondent, Jurnalul Naţional newspaper
46. Mr Ştefureac Remus, Director of Strategic Thinking Group

47. Mr Șuică Iulian, President of the Conservative Party Organization, Teleorman County
48. Mr Tiugea George-Vadim, Project Assistant, «Ovidiu Șincai» European School
49. Ms Tîrziu Diana, Project Assistant, European School of Transylvania
50. Mrs Ungureanu Cristina Manuela, Legal Advisor, Ministry of Justice
51. Mr Ursu Bogdan, Legal Advisor, Member of the Greater Romania Youth Organization
52. Mr Vasile Adrian, Honorary President of the Veterinary Medicine Students Association
53. Mr Volschi Florin Marius, General Manager, Mondial Casa Group
54. Mr Zetea Gabriel, Local Councillor, Maramureș County

Yerevan School of Political Studies

1. Ms Abrahamyan Viktoria, Journalist, A1+ news agency, VIKTORIA
2. Ms Aghabalyan Anush, Advocacy Associate, UNDP ANUSH
3. Mr Arevshatyan Vilen, Member of Council, «Kentron» Municipality VILEN
4. Mr Arshakyan Mher, Journalist, Public TV MHER
5. Ms Avagyan Nane, Reporter, «Yerkir Media» TV NANE
6. Mr Avetisyan Aleksandr, President, Centre for Voting Technologies ALEKSANDR
7. Mrs Avetisyan Hripsime, MP, National Assembly HRIPSIME
8. Mr Barseghyan Gagik, Expert, National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, Standing Committee on Finance-Credit, Budget and Economic Affairs GAGIK
9. Ms Begoyan Anush, «Researcher - Political Scientist Armenian International Policy Research Group « ANUSH
10. Mr Ghazaryan Edgar, EDGAR, Adviser, “Jermuk Group”
11. Ms Hakobyan Taguhi, Journalist, “Hetq” internet newspaper TAGUHI
12. Ms Hambardzumyan Tsovinar, Chief Specialist, Staff of the President of the Republic of Armenia TSOVINAR
13. Mrs Harutyunyan Zaruhi, Leading Specialist, Translator, Enterprise Incubator Foundation ZARUHI
14. Mr Hovhannisyan Hayk, Assistant to MP, National Assembly of RA HAYK
15. Mr Hovsepian Vahan, Project Director, Armenian Media Group Information and Legal Centre NGO VAHAN
16. Mrs Israelyan Anna, Journalist, “Aravot” Daily, Parliamentary Correspondent ANNA
17. Mr Israelyan Eduard, First Class Specialist, Ministry of Labour and Social Issues EDUARD
18. Ms KHARATYAN Armine, Member of the Central Electoral Commission of Armenia ARMINE
19. Mr Kocharyan Shavarsh, Expert, MP, National Assembly of RA SHAVARSH
20. Mr Margaryan Artur, Leading Expert, Methodology and Licensing Department, Methodology Division, National Commission on Television and Radio ARTUR
21. Ms Matinyan Astghik, Expert, Standing Committee on State and Legal Affairs, National Assembly of RA ASTGHIK

22. Mr Minasyan Artsvik, Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Professor, Faculty of Economy, Association of Accountants and Auditors of Armenia ARTSVIK
23. Mr Mkrtchyan Vahe, Interpreter VAHE
24. Mrs Mkrtumyan Estera, Project Manager, YSPS ESTERA
25. Mr Movsisyan Suren, Political Scientist, Armenian-Russian Centre «ROSAR» SUREN
26. Mr Nasibyan Hovhannes, Deputy Head, Department of International Relations, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs HOVHANNES
27. Mr Navasardyan Aram, President, “Armenian Marketing Association”, Director, “Marketing Professional Group” Company ARAM
28. Mr Norikyan Norik, President, “National Youth Centre” NGO NORIK
29. Ms Pepanyan Nune, Executive Director, Intercommunity Union “Lorut” NUNE
30. Mr Poghosyan Vardan, Expert, NGO «Democracy» VARDAN
31. Mrs Sargsyan Anahit, Lecturer, Yerevan State Institute of Economy, Chair of Management ANAHIT
32. Ms Sarkisyan Anna, Office Manager, Caucasus Research Resource Centers – Armenia, Eurasia Foundation Representative Office in Armenia ANNA
33. Mr Shakaryan Artak, Analyst, “Noravank” Scientific-Educational Foundation ARTAK
34. Mr Simonyan Tigran, Vice-President, “Lyumen” Youth NGO TIGRAN, Head of Marketing Department, “Maranik” LTD
35. Ms Solomonyan Narine, Assistant to Judge, Constitutional Court of Armenia, Lecturer of Law, “Gladzor” Management University, NARINE
36. Mr Tadevosyan Aghasi, Legal Adviser, “Glass World Company” CJSC
37. Mr Torosyan Shirak, Professor, International Relations Faculty, Yerevan State University SHIRAK
38. Mr Vardanyan Karen, Vice-President, “Barik” Charity Foundation KAREN
39. Mr Zakaryan Armen, Director, YSPS ARMEN
40. Mr Zakaryan Artak, ARTAK – “Republican Party of Armenia”, Member

Ukrainian School of Political Studies

1. Mr Ageyev Viktor, Attorney, Managing partner of the law firm «Ageev, Berezhnyi and partners»
2. Mr Bohutskyy Oleksandr, Director-general of the International commercial broadcasting company “ICTV”
3. Mr Bova Yuriy, Mayor of Trostianets
4. Ms Chepak Dariya, Start-producer of the “5 TV Channel” broadcasting company
5. Mr Chernikov Denys, Senior consultant at the Economy policy service of the Presidential Secretariat of Ukraine
6. Mr Demchuk Oleh, Deputy mayor on humanitarian issues of Kamyanets-Podilski
7. Mr Druzenko Gennadiy, Legal Counsellor, Vice-President of the European Integration Institute

8. Mr Dzhygyr Yuriy, Public finance consultant at the company “Birks Sinclair & Associates Ltd.”, Director of the consulting company “FiscoInform”
9. Ms Galpyerina Viktoriya, Senior researcher, the Institute of higher education at the Academy of pedagogical sciences of Ukraine
10. Mr Grytsak Lyubomyr, Head of the All-Ukrainian non-governmental youth organization “The Young Movement”
11. Mr Hruzyns`kyi Vladyslav, TV programs director, deputy director-general of the Kharkiv regional broadcasting company
12. Ms Kamenshchuk Tetyana, Member of the Zamistyan district council of Vinnytsya
13. Mr Khoruzhenko Oleksandr, Head of department concerning internal policy of regional state administration of Sumy, Director of the Center of researches of regional policy
14. Ms Kiriyyenko Ulyana, Deputy director of the Global strategies institute
15. Mr Kogut Igor, Ukrainian School of Political Studies
16. Mr Kovalenko Roman, Head of the Centre for legislative initiatives, Member of the Donetsk oblast Council
17. Ms Maksymova Svitlana, Editor in chief and co-founder of the publishers “Yustinian”, editor in chief of the “Law journal”, lawyer
18. Ms Mel`nykova Natalia, Editor of the informational service of the “Your radio” broadcasting company
19. Mr Minakov Mykhailo, Regional Director for Program Development for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Kyiv Regional Office Eurasia Foundation), Docent, Philosophy Department, University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
20. Mr Nakhod Mykhaylo, Head of the Lutsk local non-governmental organization “Center for policy analysis and election consulting”
21. Ms Nekrasova Nataliya, Deputy Head of non-profit communicational public organization The Support Association of Local Self Government Development (SALSGD)
22. Ms Nosova Bogdana, International department editor of the “5 TV Channel” broadcasting company
23. Mr Perets Yuriy, Head of the company “Pimentos Ltd.”
24. Mr Petrenko Oleh, Executive director of the Healthcare school at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
25. Ms Piskun Tetyana, Legal advisor at the Center for commercial law
26. Ms Pronyk Olesya, Financial manager, Ukrainian School of Political Studies
27. Ms Shcherbaniuk Oksana, Associate professor of the Law department of the Chernivtsi National University (chair of constitutional, administrative and financial law)
28. Ms Shevchuk Iryna, Head of the National office for implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights at the Ministry of Justice
29. Ms Shuvaieva Iuliia, Researcher, National Institute of Strategic Research (Crimea branch)
30. Mr Starukh Olexandr, Senior consultant-inspector of the Regional and HR policy department of the Presidential Secretariat of Ukraine, Head of the Board of the South-Ukrainian agency for social technologies
31. Ms Stohniy Iryna, Deputy head of the Kherson regional organization of the “Christian-Democratic Union” party, lawyer

32. Ms Synooka Natalya, Assistant, Ukrainian School of Political Studies
33. Mr Synookyy Oleksandr, Deputy Head of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives
34. Mr Triukhan Vadym, Head of Justice and Home Affairs – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomat
35. Ms Yasynevych Yaryna, Member of the Co-ordination Board of the All-Ukrainian civic campaign “OPORA”, organizational department co-ordinator
36. Ms Yevgenyeva Anzhela, Project co-ordinator, Ukrainian School of Political Studies
37. Mr Plashkin Igor, Representative of the Mission of Konrad Adenauer Foundation to Ukraine
38. Mr Kobets Roman, Program Director Civil Society Impact Enhancement Program – International Renaissance Foundation
39. Mr Berezenko Sergii, Member of the Kyiv City Council, Head of the All-Ukrainian non-governmental youth organization “The Young Sobor”, adviser to the Kyiv city mayor

Observers

Azerbaijan

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Belarus

1. Ms Irina Bugrova, political scientist, International Educational Centre
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4. Ms Alexandra Dynko, journalist, independent newspaper “Nasha Niva”
5. Mr Andrei Fedarau, political scientist
6. Mr Valery Karbalevich, political analyst, independent Minsk-based Strategy political analysis centre
7. Ms Tatyana Poshevalova, Chairperson of the Public association: “Centre for Social Innovations”
8. Mr Valery Ukhnaeu, United Democratic Forces – Communist Party of Belarus
9. Mr Alexander Vashkevich, former Constitutional judge, Associate Professor in the International Law Chair of the Belarusian State University, Executive Director of the Belarusian Centre for Constitutionalism and Comparative Legal Studies.
10. Mr Andrey Vardomatski, sociologist, Director of the Laboratory of Axiometrical Research

Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. Dr Taida Begic, Deputy Director, Centre for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies, University of Sarajevo

Annex III: Final Declaration

Final declaration

First Summer University for Democracy

Strasbourg, 10-14 July 2006

The participants from Council of Europe Schools of Political Studies, meeting for the first Summer University for Democracy, in Strasbourg, from 10 to 14 July 2006,

- Aware of the challenges facing democracy in today's Europe, especially in confronting the dangers of international terrorism, organised crime in all its forms, unresolved conflicts, nationalism, populism and exclusion,
- Keen to promote the fundamental values of democratic pluralism, human rights - including the rights of persons belonging to minorities - the rule of law, cultural diversity and tolerance,
- Mindful of the expectation of citizens of Europe to contribute to the process of reinforcing and promoting democracy, as voiced by the Heads of State and Government at the Third Summit of the Council of Europe, held in Warsaw in May 2005,
- Anxious to contribute to a Europe without dividing lines, based on freedom, justice and solidarity,
- Sharing the same ideals of peace, based on dialogue between peoples and respect for their identities throughout Europe,
- Emphasising the need to strengthen political and democratic stability, which will ensure social justice and economic prosperity,
- Reaffirming their attachment to systems of government based on regular, free and democratic elections,

Express their satisfaction at taking part in the first Summer University for Democracy, which has given participants an opportunity for intensive discussions and exchanges on the issues confronting our societies,

Pay tribute to the Council of Europe, an Organisation upholding human rights, democracy and the rule of law, for taking the initiative of convening this meeting,

Salute the partnership between the European Union and the Council of Europe, within the framework of the joint programme of support for the Schools of Political Studies, confirmed in particular by the President of the European Commission, before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 11 April 2006, and expect this partnership to be further broadened in the future,

Thank the "Pôle Européen d'Administration Publique" (PEAP), the City of Strasbourg, the Conseil Général du Bas-Rhin, the Conseil Régional d'Alsace and the Council of Europe's partners for their contribution to the holding of the Summer University and stress their attachment to the unique role of Strasbourg, European capital of democracy and of human rights,

Call on all European institutions, national authorities and foundations to support the consolidation and enlargement of the Council of Europe Network of Schools of Political Studies, a civil society

initiative designed to ensure that the fundamental values, which make up the European democratic project, take root in every European country and to develop the capacity of political and civic leaders to effectively implement these values,

Support the Council of Europe's efforts to set up new Schools of Political Studies,

Welcome the proposal to create a School for Belarus, in order to contribute to the democratic development in this country and its integration into the family of European democracies,

Invite national governments and European institutions to reaffirm their commitment to gender equality,

Invite European institutions and national governments to develop mechanisms for involving young people in decision-making processes, as an opportunity to give new dynamism to European democracies,

State their willingness to contribute to the Forum for the Future of Democracy, set up by the Warsaw Summit and other relevant programmes, designed to boost the role and involvement of civil society in the building of European unity,

Undertake, in the exercise of their respective responsibilities, to implement the principles and values enshrined in the Statute of the Council of Europe,

Invite the Council of Europe and its partners to renew the successful experience of the Summer University for Democracy in 2007, and call on networks of Alumni of the Schools to play an active role in its future development.

Strasbourg, 14 July 2006


Moscow School of Political Studies



Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence



Tbilisi School of Political Studies



Academy for Political Development, Zagreb




Bulgarian School of Politics



“Ovidiu Șincai” European School



European Institute for Political Studies in Moldova



Yerevan School of Political Studies



Pristina Institute for Political Studies



Ukrainian School of Political Studies



Skopje School of Politics

